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      Insolvency News and Analysis - Week Ending October 17, 2014
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    Insolvency News and Analysis – Week Ending October 10, 2014

    Friday, October 10th, 2014

    Current Events

    Commercial Restructuring and Bankruptcy News (ReedSmith, LLP)

    Venue

    The Short Case for Venue Reform

    Procedure

    Proposed Bankruptcy Rule and Official Form Changes

    Secured Claims

    Just When You Thought You Were Out, They Pull You Back In

    Credit bidding challenges in bankruptcy

    Administrative Claims

    When Are Goods “Received” by the Debtor? Establishing International Suppliers’ Entitlement to 503(b)(9) Administrative Expense Claim

    Executory Contracts, IP, and Licensing

    Questioning the Executoriness of Trademark Licenses in Integrated Agreements

    Avoidance and Recovery Actions

    Dilution Of Corporate Stock As A Fraudulent Transfer In Antonello

    R-E-C-O-V-E-R: Find Out What It Means to the Third Circuit

    Strong Arm Powers: What Can Be Done With An Avoided Lien?

    Uniform Voidable Transactions Act Approved by Uniform Law Commission to Replace UFTA

    Subordination and Recharacterization

    Focusing on Intent in Recharacterization Analysis, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Ruling Indicates that Creditors Seeking Derivative Standing Face High Hurdle

    Bankruptcy Sales

    Opportunistic Acquisitions: Buying Assets Through Bankruptcy

    Sales Free and Clear: What About Restrictive Covenants?

    Conversion and Dismissal

    Taking a Stand Where Few Have Trodden: Structured Dismissal Held Clearly Authorized by the Bankruptcy Code

    Cross-Border

    Brazilian Reorganization Plan: Fundamentally Fair or Wholesale Trampling of Creditors’ Rights?

    U.S. Causes of Action and Attorney Retainer Fund Sufficient Assets for Chapter 15 Recognition

    A “Second Bite” from the Second Circuit: Revisiting Section 363 Review of Transfers in Chapter 15 Bankruptcy Cases

    Second Circuit Holds That a Sale by a Chapter 15 Debtor in a Foreign Main Proceeding of a Claim Against an Obligor Located in the U.S. Must Be Reviewed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court Under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code

    Related articles

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    Paid in Full

    Sunday, August 10th, 2014
    American National Bank AD

    American National Bank AD (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

    One of the fundamental functions of any bankruptcy proceeding is the establishment of an amount and priority for each creditor’s claim against the debtor. A short, 5-page decision issued late last month by the Nebraska Bankruptcy Court in two related Chapter 11 cases (Biovance and Julien) serves as a reminder that although creditors are not permitted a “double recovery” on their claims, they are nevertheless permitted to assert the full value of their claims until those claims are paid in full.

     
    In the US, it is common for creditors to mitigate credit risk through two primary means: Taking a security interest in the debtor’s collateral, and/or securing a guaranty of payment from a [non-debtor] third party. Further, and in the event of a payment default, courts frequently recognize a creditor’s right to pursue simultaneous collection activity for the entirety of the debt against the debtor, the collateral, and the guarantor. In a recent decision involving two related Chapter 11 debtors, a Nebraska Bankruptcy Court was asked by the debtors to limit the amounts claimed by a creditor as the creditor had already received a portion of the payments owed to it.

     
    In this case, a business debtor (Biovance) had leased equipment from American National Bank (ANB), collateralizing one of the leases with a certificate of deposit held by that debtor.  The other lease was protected by a guarantee issued by the individual debtor (Julien) to ANB.  ANB had obtained permission to collect its collateral with respect to the first lease, and to liquidate its claims in Nebraska state court with respect to the second (which claims were subsequently settled).  The debtors argued, among other things, that as the confirmed bankruptcy plan provided for payment in full of all claims, the creditor was therefore obligated to immediately credit the amounts it had received.  ANB argued that a proof of claim filed under 11 U.S.C. § 502 need not be reduced by amounts recovered from a third party unless it stood the chance of a double recovery.

     
    The Bankruptcy Court of Nebraska agreed with ANB, noting that the confirmed plan is neither a recovery nor payment in full. It is only a promise to pay. The Court went on to hold that until such time as ANB had actually received its payment in full, it was entitled to assert the balance due against all concerned parties – including the debtors.

     
    Establishing the amount and priority for each creditor’s claim against the debtor fixes the limit of recoveries available to a creditor from the debtor’s estate. Such claims are, in the aggregate, an important factor in the creditors’ assessment of the feasibility of a debtor’s proposed reorganization – and in determining whether liquidation offers them a preferable recovery.

     
    The Biovance decision, though not surprising, nevertheless reminds creditors and their counsel to preserve all of the value of their claims, even if paid partially, until the claims are paid in full.

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    The Little Things

    Friday, June 27th, 2014

    O to grace how great a debtor, daily I'm const...

    In the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan – as in life – it is often the little things that count.

    Late last month, a Houston Bankruptcy Court provided helpful guidance on a very seldom-discussed, and often-overlooked, confirmation issue:  Whether the reorganized debtor’s management make-up and structure is consistent with “public policy.”  A copy of that decision is available here.

    Barring an outright sale of assets, the confirmation of a plan of reorganization is typically the centerpiece of any Chapter 11 case.  Chapter 11’s confirmation provisions – set forth in section 1129 – impose a broad variety of requirements on the debtor, all of which must be met or legitimately excused under recognized exceptions.  Though many of these requirements have been extensively litigated and discussed by Bankruptcy Courts, several – including those pertaining to the governance and ownership structure of the reorganized debtor – have not enjoyed nearly as much review or discussion.  Before the Bankruptcy Court in In re Digerati Technologies, Inc. was the issue of whether the debtor’s proposed management structure was appropriate in light of the Code’s requirement that post-confirmation management be appointed on terms “consistent . . . with public policy” under § 1129(a)(5)(A)(ii).

    Digerati Technologies filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in May 2013.  The plan submitted by Digerati proposed that the CEO and CFO of the company, who were also stockholders and creditors of Digerati, continue as the officers and directors of the reorganized debtor entity, positions which they had occupied within the two years prior to Digerati’s Chapter 11.  Digerati was a publicly-traded holding company for an operational subsidiary.  Thus, the plan’s proposed ongoing “officer and director” capacity also left Digerati’s CEO and CFO effectively in control of Digerati’s subsidiary.

    Two Digerati stockholders objected to the plan on the grounds that Digerati’s pre-petition self-dealing established that continuation of Digerati’s pre-petition management was “not in the best interest of the estate, the creditors, the equity security holders and fail[ed] to satisfy public policy.”  On the basis of the evidence adduced at the confirmation hearing, the Bankruptcy Court denied confirmation of Digerati’s plan for its inability to satisfy the requirements of section 1129(a)(5)(A)(ii).  In the process, the Court formulated a nine-point checklist of essential factors relevant to determining whether appointment of an individual to serve as an officer of a reorganized debtor is consistent with public policy:

    (1) Does the proposed plan, if confirmed, keep the debtor in existence as an ongoing company, or is the debtor extinguished?

    (2) Is the debtor a publicly- or privately-held company?

    (3) Does continued service of the individual(s) proposed for officers and directors perpetuate incompetence, lack of direction, inexperience, or affiliations with groups inimical to the best interests of the debtor?

    (4) Does the continued service of the proposed individual(s) provide adequate representation of all creditors and equity security owners?

    (5) Does the retention of the proposed individual(s) violate state law in any respect?

    (6) Is each proposed individual a “disinterested person”?

    (7) Is each proposed individual capable and competent to serve in the proposed capacity assigned to him or her?

    (8) Are the salaries and benefits that the proposed individual(s) will receive reasonable based upon the size of the debtor’s operations, the complexity of these operations, and the revenues to be generated?

    (9) Are there any new independent outside directors being appointed under the proposed plan?

    Digerati Technologies‘ review of applicable case law further highlights the following:

    - Such little case law as exists on section 1129(a)(5)(A)(ii) suggests that a consistent focus is on whether management and the board of directors is “disinterested.”  Here, Digerati’s management was not.

    - At least one decision reviewed by the Bankruptcy Court suggests that, where present management will continue, management’s track record is relevant:  Though Bankruptcy Courts are often reluctant to “second-guess” a debtor’s management, they will not reward or perpetuate incompetence and gross mismanagement where it clearly exists.

    - Still another decision reviewed by the Bankruptcy Court focused on management’s level of compensation, relative to its experience and the demands of managing the debtor.

    - Finally, the Bankruptcy Court’s helpful list of summarized factors, digested from all of the decisions, offers practitioners a useful “road map” to consider in drafting a Chapter 11 plan.

    The Digerati decision serves as a reminder that all of Chapter 11’s requirements, no matter how seemingly arcane, must be met prior to a plan’s confirmation.  In hotly-contested matters, these requirements can often be a source of contention and – on occasion – tactical advantage.  In addition to this important reminder, Digerati offers both debtors’ and creditors’ counsel a helpful checklist for assessing their relative positions on the question of the debtor’s proposed corporate governance.

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    Insolvency News and Analysis – June 20, 2014

    Friday, June 20th, 2014
    Alphabetical by Author

    Alphabetical by Author (Photo credit: woohoo_megoo)

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Bankruptcy and Insolvency News and Analysis – Week of June 16 – 20, 2014:

    Confirmation:

    Prevalence and Utility of Roadmap Decisions in Mega-Cases

    No Confirmation Without Representation: New Test Is Proposed for Approval of a Debtor’s Proposed Slate of Post-Confirmation Officers and Directors

    Bankruptcy Sales:

    Bankruptcy Sale: No Stay Pending Appeal, Then No Appeal?

    Secured Lending and Claims:

    An L of a Mess: Perfecting Against LLP’s

    Equity Begets Flexibility: Valuing a Secured Creditor’s Claim in Bankruptcy and Allocating Post-Petition Interest

    Avoidance Actions:

    Seventh Circuit Reads Bankruptcy Safe Harbor Broadly

    Defending Preference and Claw-Back Actions in the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Bellingham Decision

    Executory Contracts and Intellectual Property:

    Contract Remedies in the Face of Imminent Default – What Happens to State Law Adequate Assurance and Anticipatory Breach in Bankruptcy?

    Eighth Circuit reconsiders trademark licenses in bankruptcy

    Cross-Border:

    Comity and drama: current trends in cross-border insolvencies

    Jurisdiction and Bellingham Analysis:

    Supreme Court’s decision in Bellingham leaves key Stern v Marshall questions unanswered

    And Still More:

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    When a Good Deal . . . Isn’t.

    Monday, July 1st, 2013

    A very recent decision out of California’s Central District Bankruptcy Court highlights the boundaries of “commercial reason” and “diligence” where distressed asset sales are concerned.

    In re 1617 Westcliff, LLC (Case No. 8:12-bk-19326-MW) involved the court-approved sale of the debtor’s real property under a purchase agreement in which the debtor and the purchaser agreed to use their “commercially reasonable and diligent efforts” to obtain the approval of the debtor’s mortgage lender for the assumption of the mortgage debt by the buyer.  If the approval was not obtainable, the buyer had the right to terminate the transaction.  The buyer also had the right to terminate the deal if the assumption required payment of more than a 1% assumption fee.

    As is sometimes the case where due diligence remains while a deal is approved, things didn’t quite work out as planned.  Unfortunately, the bank proved less cooperative than the parties had anticipated.  More importantly, however, the buyer notified the debtor-seller 4 days prior to closing that it would not proceed with the transaction as structured, but might be willing to proceed if the transaction was framed as a tax deferred exchange.

    The debtor was, understandably, somewhat less than receptive to restructuring the deal at the 11th hour.  It insisted that the buyer proceed with the transaction as originally agreed and as approved by the court.  In response, the buyer effectively walked away.  The parties then made competing demands on the escrow company regarding the buyer’s $200,000 deposit, and filed cross-motions with Bankruptcy Judge Mark Wallace to enforce them.

    In a brief, 11-page decision, Judge Wallace found that the buyer’s renunciation of the deal 4 days before closing was a material breach of the buyer’s obligation to use “commercially reasonable and diligent efforts” to obtain assumption consent:

    The Purchase Agreement required [the buyer] to keep working in good faith for an assumption until the close of business on May 10, 2013, not to throw up its hands and to propose – at the eleventh hour – a wholesale restructuring of the purchase transaction in a manner completely foreign to the Purchase Agreement.  On [the date of the proposal] there were still four days left to reach agreement with the Bank, but [the buyer] chose (five months into the deal) to abandon the assumption.  It was not commercially reasonable nor was it diligent for [the buyer] to cease negotiations with the Bank relating to the assumption of the loan under these circumstances.
    Judge Wallace found that due to this breach the debtor was entitled to retain the $200,000 deposit.  He found further that the buyer, by offering to purchase the property in a restructured transaction, had failed to effectively terminate the deal.  Instead, the buyer had indicated that it was “eager to keep the Purchase Agreement in force (on terms other than those agreed to).”  Since the deal had not terminated, the buyer remained under a duty to continue to use reasonable efforts to obtain the bank’s consent.  Its failure to do so caused the loss of its deposit.

    Bill of sale sedan 1927

    Bill of sale sedan 1927 (Photo credit: dlofink)

    The 1617 Westcliff decision (the unpublished slip copy is available here) serves as a reminder to buyer’s counsel of the unique nature of distressed asset purchases.  The Bankruptcy Court which originally approved the purchase remains available and prepared to resolve any issues which may arise prior to closing, often at a fraction of what it would cost to get a Superior Court involved in connection with an unraveled private sale.  And conditions and contingencies to the sale must be carefully drafted and observed.  This applies even to common asset-purchase “boilerplate” such as “commercial reasonableness” and “diligence.”

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    Cherry Picking.

    Friday, June 14th, 2013

    In a 23-page memorandum decision issued yesterday, New York Bankruptcy Judge Stewart Bernstein ruled that the debtor and a third party were parties to a master agreement that allowed the debtor to issue purchase orders that the counter-party was required to fill.  Judge Bernstein held that the debtor could assume the master agreement but could reject individual purchase orders.  The purchase orders were divisible from the master agreement.

    English: Sketch of Richard Mentor Johnson free...

    English: Sketch of Richard Mentor Johnson freeing a man from debtors' prison. Johnson was an advocate of ending the practice of debt imprisonment throughout his political career. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

    The decision (available here) provides a thorough analysis of when – and under what circumstances – an executory agreement may be “divisible” into separate, individual agreements . . . which can then be selectively assumed or rejected by a debtor or trustee.

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    A Formula for Confusion

    Monday, January 23rd, 2012
    Inc

    Image by Guudmorning! via Flickr

    Thanks to an active lobby in Congress, commercial landlords have historically enjoyed a number of lease protections under the Bankruptcy Code.  Even so, those same landlords nevertheless face limits on the damages they can assert whenever a tenant elects to reject a commercial lease.

    Section 502(b)(6) limits landlords’ lease rejection claims pursuant to a statutory formula, calculated as “the [non-accelerated] rent reserved by [the] lease . . . for the greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term of such lease . . . .”

    This complicated and somewhat ambiguous language leaves some question as to whether or not the phrase “rent reserved for . . . 15 percent . . . of the remaining term of such lease” is a reference to time or to money:  That is, does the specified 15 percent refer to the “rent reserved?”  Or to the “remaining term?”

    Many courts apply the formula with respect to the “rent reserved.”   See. e.g., In re USinternetworking, Inc., 291 B.R. 378, 380 (Bankr.D.Md.2003) (citing In re Today’s Woman of Florida, Inc., 195 B.R. 506 (Bankr.M.D.Fl.1996); In re Gantos, 176 B.R. 793 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1995); In re Financial News Network, Inc., 149 B.R. 348 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1993); In re Communicall Cent., Inc., 106 B.R. 540 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989); In re McLean Enter., Inc., 105 B.R. 928 (Bank.W.D.Mo.1989)).  These courts calculate the amount of rent due over the remaining term of the lease and multiply that amount times 15%.

    Other courts calculate lease rejection damages based on 15% of the “remaining term” of the lease.  See, e.g., In re Iron–Oak Supply Corp., 169 B.R. 414, 419 n. 8 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.1994); In re Allegheny Intern., Inc., 145 B.R. 823 (W.D.Pa.1992); In re PPI Enterprises, Inc., 324 F.3d 197, 207 (3rd Cir.2003).

    For more mathematically-minded readers, the differently-applied formulas appear as follows:

    Rent-Based Formula: Maximum Rejection Damages = (Rent x Remaining Term) x 0.15
       
    Term-Based Formula: Maximum Rejection Damages = Rent x (Remaining Term x 0.15)

    Earlier this month, a Colorado bankruptcy judge, addressing the issue for the first time in that state, sided with those courts who read the statutory 15% in terms of time:

    “In practice, by reading the 15% limitation consistently with the remainder of § 502(b)(6)(A) as a reference to a period of time, any lease with a remaining term of 80 months or less is subject to a cap of one year of rent [i.e.,15% of 80 months equals 12 months] and any lease with a remaining term of 240 months or more will be subject to a cap of three years rent [i.e., 15% of 240 months equals 36 months].  Those in between are capped at the rent due for 15% of the remaining lease term.”

    In re Shane Co., 2012 WL 12700 (Bkrtcy. D.Colo., January 4, 2012).

    The decision also addresses a related question:  To what “rent” should the formula apply – the contractual rent applicable for the term?  Or the unpaid rent remaining after the landlord has mitigated its damages?  Under the statute, “rents reserved” refers to contractual rents, and not to those remaining unpaid after the landlord has found a new tenant or otherwise mitigated.

    Colorado Bankruptcy Judge Tallman’s decision, which cites a number of earlier cases on both sides of the formula, is available here.

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    “Collateral Damage”? Or “Credit to Whom Credit is Due”?

    Monday, December 19th, 2011
    Collateral Damage (film)

    Image via Wikipedia

    Outside of bankruptcy, a creditor whose loan is secured by collateral typically has the right to payment in full when that collateral is sold – or, if the collateral is sold at an auction, to “credit bid” the face amount of the debt against the auction price of the collateral.

    Inside bankruptcy, however, the right to “credit bid” is not always guaranteed.

    In July, this blog predicted Supreme Court review of a Seventh Circuit case addressing the question of whether a bankruptcy court may confirm a plan of reorganization that proposes to sell substantially all of the debtor’s assets without permitting secured creditors to bid with credit.  The courts of appeals are divided two to one over the question, with the Third and Fifth Circuits holding that creditors are not entitled to credit bid and the Seventh Circuit holding to the contrary (for a review of the more recent, Seventh Circuit decision, click here).

    The question is one of great significance for commercial restructuring practice, with several bankruptcy law scholars suggesting the answer “holds billions of dollars in the balance.”

    Apparently, the Supreme Court agrees.  Last week, the justices granted review of the Seventh Circuit decision.  For the petitioners’ brief, respondent’s opposition, and amicus briefs, click here.

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    River Road Hotel Partners

    Sunday, July 10th, 2011

    One of the time-honored attractions of US bankruptcy practice is the set of tools provided for the purchase and sale of distressed firms, assets and real estate.  In recent years, the so-called “363 sale” has been a favorite mechanism for such transactions – its popularity owing primarily to the speed with which they can be accomplished, as well as to the comparatively limited liability which follows the assets through such sales.

    But “363 sales” have their limits:  In such a sale, a secured creditor is permitted to “credit bid” against the assets securing its lien – often permitting that creditor to obtain a “blocking” position with respect to sale of the assets.

    Seal of the United States Court of Appeals for...

    Image via Wikipedia

     

    Until very recently, many practitioners believed these “credit bid” protections also applied whenever assets were being sold through a Chapter 11 plan.  In 2009 and again in 2010, however, the Fifth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal held, respectively, that a sale through a Chapter 11 Plan didn’t require credit bidding and could be approved over the objection of a secured lender, so long as the lienholder received the “indubitable equivalent” of its interest in the assets (for more on the meaning of “indubitable equivalence,” see this recent post).

    Lenders, understandably concerned about the implications of this rule for their bargaining positions vis a vis their collateral in bankruptcy, were relieved when, about 10 days ago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals respectfully disagreed – and held that “credit bidding” protections still apply whenever a sale is proposed through a Chapter 11 Plan.

    The Circuit’s decision in In re River Road Hotel Partners (available here) sets up a split in the circuits – and the possibility of Supreme Court review.  In the meanwhile, lenders may rest a little easier, at least in the Seventh Circuit.

    Or can they?

    It has been observed that the Seventh Circuit’s River Road Hotel Partners decision and the Third Circuit’s earlier decision both involved competitive auctions – i.e., bidding – in which the only “bid” not permitted was the lender’s credit bid.  The Fifth Circuit’s earlier decision, however, involved a sale following a judicial valuation of the collateral at issue.

    Is it possible to accomplish a sale without credit bidding – even in the Seventh Circuit – so long as the sale does not involve an auction, and is instead preceded by a judicial valuation?

    Stay tuned.

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    Valuing Companies in Chapter 11 – Courts Weigh In On Supportability Of Assumptions

    Wednesday, July 6th, 2011

    Guest-blogger Ray Clark of Valcor (whose prior posts appear here, here, and here) has recently completed a succinct but helpful piece on the valuation of firms in Chapter 11.

    Ray’s piece focuses on the supportability of assumptions underlying valuations.  As he notes:

    Over the last year, there have been a rash of bankruptcy cases and related lawsuits involving challenges to both debtor and creditor financial experts, wherein opposing parties successfully attacked the relevance and reliability of valuation evidence. In a number of cases, even traditional methodologies were disqualified for lack of supportable assumptions, which severely impacted recoveries for various stakeholders.

    The piece is here.

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