Taking Derivative Risk Out of the Code
In light of the tumultuous economic events of 2008 and 2009, a number of proposals for significant bankruptcy reform have surfaced – many of which have been summarized on this blog.
One of last year’sÂ posts focused on the ongoing debate over the impact of credit derivatives on failing companies, and on the continued usefulness of Bankruptcy Code provisions designed to insulate the financial markets from the bankruptcy process.
Last week, Harvard’s Mark Roe added to that discussion with a paper entitled “Bankruptcyâ€™s Financial Crisis Accelerator: The Derivatives Playersâ€™ Priorities in Chapter 11”
The essence of Professor Roe’s proposal is set forth at p. 3:
Although several of [the Bankruptcy Codeâ€™s safe-harbor super-priorities for derivatives and repurchase agreements] are functional and ought to be kept, the full range is far too broad. Most are more likely to destabilize financial markets than to stabilize them and most need to be repealed.
Professor Roe’s thoughtful analysisÂ is a worthwhile read.