Most readers of this blog are aware that, under the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 11 debtor (or the trustee appointed in the debtor’s case)Â is entitled to seek â€śavoidanceâ€ť of a limited set of pre-bankruptcy â€śpreferenceâ€ť payments, providedÂ it can establish the payments were made:
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt . . . ;
(3) . . . while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) . . . on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition; . . . and
(5) that enables [the] creditor to receive more than [its anticipated pro rata distribution in Chapter 7].
Even if all these elements are met, however, the Bankruptcy Code provides creditors with an affirmative â€śordinary course of businessâ€ť defense.
Though articulated slightly differently by different courts,Â 11 U.S.C. Â§547(c)(2) essentially provides that the â€śordinary course of business exceptionâ€ť permits a creditor to retain transfers made by a debtor to a creditor during the ninety days before the petition date if: (1) such transfers were made for a debt incurred in the â€śordinary course of businessâ€ť of the parties; and either (2) the transfers were made in the â€śordinary course of businessâ€ť of the parties; or (3) the transfers were made in accordance with â€śordinary business terms.â€ť
Once an “ordinary course” relationship is established between the debtor and the creditor who received allegedly preferential payments, the focus shifts to showing whether or not the payments at issue complied with “ordinary course” timing and terms.
To show this, the preference defendant must demonstrate thatÂ the relevant payments did not differ from past payments in â€śamountâ€ť or â€śform,â€ť were not the result of â€śunusual collection or payment activit[ies],â€ť or did not come as a result of the â€ścreditor [taking] advantage of the debtorâ€™s deteriorating financial condition.â€ť
Importantly, the emphasis is on the payments themselves – rather than on what the debtor and creditor may have otherwise considered or discussed.Â This distinction is illustrated in a recent decision issued by Judge Christopher Sontchi in Burtch v. Detroit Forming, Inc. (In re Archway Cookies) (available here).
In Burtch v. Detroit Forming, the Trustee in a Chapter 7 case (converted from one under Chapter 11) commenced an adversary proceeding against Detroit Forming, Inc. (â€śDFIâ€ť) seeking to avoid as preferential six (6) transfers totaling $180,648.17.Â DFI asserted the “ordinary course” defense, arguing it had a two-year suppplier relationship with the debtors and that it had received the payments in question under the same timing and terms as those extant throughout this relationship.
DFI’s defense is typical of that offered under the “ordinary course” defense:Â It established a specific range of days-to-payment from invoicing, then showed that the payments in question were timed substantially similar to the days-to-payment average and under similar terms (i.e., by check rather than by wire transfer or COD).
Notably, the Court was not troubled by a letter sent by DFIâ€™s CFO/Controller notifying the Debtors that no product would be shipped unless the accounts were current.Â For purposes of establishing “ordinary course,” it was the subjective relationship that existed between the debtor and the preference defendant which mattered – rather than the debtor’s relations with all its creditors.
Burtch v. Detroit Forming is instructive on what it takes to mount a successful “ordinary course” defense, as is the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision in Sigma Micro v. Healthcentral.com (In re Healthcentral.com) (availabe here) – a similar case where the defendant’s “ordinary course” analysis was deemed sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment, and where the Ninth Circuit placed little stock in the debtor’s evidence of pre-petition “old school” cash management practices whereby the debtor’s management determined each week which creditors would be paid, and how much.