Posts Tagged ‘Ponzi scheme’
Monday, February 15th, 2010
A brief update on Stanford (earlier posts are available here):
Evidentiary hearings scheduled for late January in the ongoing struggle for control over the financial assets of Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB), the cornerstone of Allen Stanford‚Äôs financial-empire-turned-Ponzi-scheme, were cancelled by presiding US District Court Judge David Godbey.
As readers of this blog are aware, Antiguan liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith‚Äôs efforts to obtain recognition in the US for their Antiguan wind-up of SIB, and US receiver Ralph Janvey‚Äôs competing efforts to do the same in Canadian and UK courts, were to culminate in a hearing set for late last month.¬† But shortly after a scheduled status conference on pre-hearing matters, the evidentiary was cancelled.
Recent reporting by Reuters (available here) may provide a reason for the change: Reuters reported on February 5 that the liquidators and Mr. Janvey may, in fact, be settling. According to staff writer Anna Driver, a dispute over $370 million in assets traced to Stanford, as well as $200 million located in Switzerland and the UK, are driving the parties toward a deal.
But there may be other pressures as well. The Associated Press reported (here) that last Thursday, Judge Godbey indicated his intent to rule on a request by third-party investors to commence their own involuntary bankruptcy filing, thereby replacing Mr. Janvey as a receiver.
Monday, January 4th, 2010
Evidentiary hearings are scheduled for later this month in the ongoing struggle for control over the financial assets of Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB), the cornerstone of Allen Stanford’s financial-empire-turned-Ponzi-scheme.¬† A series of posts on this blog have covered liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith’s efforts to obtain recognition in the US for their Antiguan wind-up of SIB, and US receiver Ralph Janvey’s competing efforts¬†to do the same in Canadian and UK courts.
The Stanford case is of considerable significance in the US – and in the UK and Canada, where it has spawned at least two decisions and related appeals over the parties’ efforts to obtain cross-border recognition for their respective efforts to clean up the Stanford mess.
In Dallas, Texas, where an enforcement action commenced by the American Securities and Exchange Commission remains pending (and where Mr. Janvey has been appointed as a receiver for the purposes of marshalling Stanford assets for distribution to creditors), US District Court Judge David Godbey has taken prior pleadings from both sides under advisement and, in advance of¬†this month’s hearing,¬†has requested further briefing on three issues.¬† Mr. Janvey’s brief, submitted last week,¬†addresses each of these as follows:
The Current State of Fifth Circuit Law on What Constitutes an Entity’s “Principal Place of Business,” Including Whether Stanford International Bank’s (“SIB”) Activities Were Active, Passive or “Far Flung.”
The Liquidators have argued that, under applicable Fifth Circuit standards, SIB’s “principal place of business” was Antigua and¬†that its activities were actively managed from Antigua, and were not “far flung” so as to render SIB’s Antiguan location irrelevant.
Predictably enough, Mr. Janvey responds that under appropriate circumstances, the Fifth Circuit applies principles of alter ego and disregards corporate formalities in determining an entity’s ‚Äúprincipal place of business:‚ÄĚ¬† “The Fifth Circuit applies alter ego doctrines not only to enforce liability against shareholders and parent companies, but also to determine a corporation‚Äôs ‘principal place of business’ for jurisdictional purposes.” (citing Freeman v. Nw. Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Based on this construction of Fifth Circuit law – and because COMI is generally equated to an entity’s “principal place of business” under US corporate law – ¬†¬†Janvey then argues that consistency and logic require the same rules be followed for COMI purposes.¬† He then goes on to argue that Stanford’s Ponzi scheme activities were ‚Äúfar flung,‚ÄĚ that SIB‚Äôs Antiguan operations were ‚Äúpassive,‚ÄĚ and that its ‚Äúnerve center‚ÄĚ and ‚Äúplace of activity‚ÄĚ were both in the U.S.
The Relationship Between SIB and the Financial Advisors Who Marketed SIB’s CDs to Potential Investors.
Wastell and Hamilton-Smith have argued that financial advisors who sold SIB’s CDs to potential investors were, in fact, independent agents employed by other, independent¬†Stanford broker-dealer entities and were not controlled by SIB.
Mr. Janvey pours scorn on this argument.¬† According to him, it does not matter that there were inter-company ‚Äúcontracts‚ÄĚ purporting to make the Stanford broker-dealer entities agents for SIB in the sale of CDs.¬† As Mr. Janvey views it, a fraud is a fraud . . .¬†from beginning to end.¬† Consequently, there was no substance to the “contracts” as all the entities involved were instruments of Stanford‚Äôs fraud.
The “Single Business Enterprise” Concept as Part of the “Alter Ego” Theory of Imposing Liability.
As noted above, Mr. Janvey takes the position that “alter ego” treatment of the Stanford entities is not only viable – it is the only appropriate means of treating SIB’s relationship to other, US-based Stanford entities, and of determining COMI for SIB.¬† He argues further that substantive consolidation – the bankruptcy remedy referred to by Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith – can be just as effectively accomplished through a federal receivership, which affords US District Courts significant latitude in fashioning equitable remedies and determining distributions to various classes of creditors.
Mr. Janvey’s argument appears quite straightforward.¬† Because a fraud is a fraud, geography matters very little in determining its “center of main interests.”¬† According to him, what should count instead is the location of the fraudsters and the place from which the fraud was managed and directed.¬† Yet even Mr. Janvey acknowledges that “Antigua played a role in [Stanford's Ponzi] scheme . . . [in that] [Antigua] was where Stanford could buy off key officials in order to conduct his sham business without regulatory interference.”¬† In other words, geography was important . . . at least for Stanford.¬† Specifically, geography provided Stanford direct access to a corrupt regulator who would afford cover for the conduct of Stanford’s fraudulent CD sales to investors.
Mr. Janvey addresses this potential problem by taking aim at the entire Antiguan regulatory structure:
“Chapter 15 contains a public policy exception: ‘Nothing in the chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.’ 11 U.S.C. ¬ß 1506. The facts warrant application of the public policy exception here. The very agency that first appointed the Antiguan [l]iquidators and then obtained their confirmation from the Antiguan court was complicit in Stanford’s fraud. That same agency has allowed financial fraud to flourish on Antigua for decades. It would be contrary to public policy for this Court to cede to Antigua the winding up of a company that bilked Americans and others out of billions when it was Antigua that permitted the fraud.”
Mr. Janvey then goes further still, arguing that Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith (and their employer, British-based Vantis plc) are precluded by Antiguan law from complying with the disclosure requirements Judge Godbey has imposed on the US receivership – and therefore simply unable to concurrently administer a “main case” in Antigua and cooperate with the Receiver (or with the District Court) in the US.
Finally, Mr. Janvey gets directly personal: He recites the opinion of the Canadian court that revoked Vantis’ administration of Stanford’s Canadian operations and refused recognition of the Antiguan wind-up on the grounds that “Vantis’ conduct, through [Messr's. Wastell and Hamiton-Smith], disqualifies it from acting and precludes it from presenting the motion [for Canadian recognition], as [Vantis] cannot be trusted by the [Canadian] Court . . . .”¬† The Canadian court’s opinion has been upheld on appeal, and is now final.
In a nutshell, Mr. Janvey argues that geography shouldn’t matter where a fraud is concerned¬†. . . but if it does matter, it ought to count against jurisdictions such as Antigua, an “impoverished¬†island” which has a population “about 80% that of Waco, Texas” and a history of financial fraud.
As is sometimes said in Texas, “Them’s fightin’ words.”
The SEC’s brief, like Mr. Janvey’s,¬†is also on file.¬† Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith’s reply will be due shortly.
Monday, December 14th, 2009
An update regarding Peter¬†Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith’s¬†dispute with¬†federal Receiver Ralph Janvey over¬†control of Stanford International Bank Ltd. (SIB)’s financial assets, and¬†the 13th in a series on this blog covering the dissolution of Allen Stanford’s erstwhile financial empire and alleged international “Ponzi scheme” – a dissolution playing out in Montreal, London, and Dallas.
Wastell and Hamilton-Smith, liquidators appointed by Antiguan regulators for the purpose of winding up SIB in Antigua, and Janvey – a federal Receiver appointed at the behest of the US Securities and Exchange Commission to oversee the dissolution of Stanford’s financial interests in connection with an enforcement proceeding in the US – have¬†sought recognition of their respective efforts in courts outside their home jurisdictions.¬† Each has met with mixed results: Janvey’s request for recognition was denied in the UK, while Wastell and Hamilton-Smith, originally recognized in Canada, have been removed and replaced by a Canadian firm.¬† Each of these results has been appealed.
Meanwhile, Wastell and Hamilton-Smith have sought recognition of the Antiguan wind-up in Janvey’s home court pursuant to Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code.¬† Initial briefing was submitted several months ago; supplemental filings (including copies of the decisions rendered in London and Montreal) have been trickling in.¬† US District Court Judge David Godbey has set an evidentiary hearing for mid-January 2010.
Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith’s supplemental¬†brief, filed last week in Dallas,¬†addresses three issues, apparently raised by Judge Godbey during a recent conference call with the parties:
The Current State of Fifth Circuit Law on What Constitutes an Entity’s “Principal Place of Business,” Including Whether Stanford International Bank’s (“SIB”) Activities Were Active, Passive or “Far Flung.”
The liquidators acknowledge that while Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code doesn’t refer to an entity’s “principal place of business” in dealing with a cross-border insolvency,¬†many US courts nevertheless analogize an entity’s “principal place of business” to its “center of main interests” (COMI) for purposes of determining the forum that should host the “main case.”¬†¬† The American approach is, according to the liquidators, similar to that followed by European courts.
That said,¬†what constitutes an entity’s¬†”principal place of business” is not a settled¬†question under US federal case law: The Fifth Circuit (where the Stanford matters are pending) applies a “total activity” test, which is also applied by the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, whereas the Ninth Circuit applies a “place of operations” test, the Seventh Circuit applies a “nerve center” test, and the Third Circuit examines the corporation’s center of activity.¬† The liquidators suggest in a footnote that these “varying verbal formulas” are functional equivalents, and “generally amount to about the same thing” under nearly any given set of facts.
A significant portion of the liquidators’ brief is devoted to applying the facts of SIB’s dissolution to the Fifth Circuit’s “verbal formula;” i.e., “(1) when considering a corporation whose operations are far-flung, the sole nerve center of that corporation is more significant in determining principal place of business, (2) when a corporation has its sole operation in one state and executive offices in another, the place of activity is regarded as more significant, but (3) when the activity of a corporation is passive and the ‚Äėbrain’ of that corporation is in another state, the situs of the corporation’s brain is given greater significance.”¬† See J.A. Olson Co. v. City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 411 (5th Cir. 1987).
The liquidators argue:
- SIB’s principal place of business was in Antigua;
- SIB’s activities were neither “passive” nor “far flung” and thus the “nerve center” test should not predominate; but
- even if SIB’s operations were passive or far flung (which they were not), its “nerve center” was in Antigua.
The Relationship Between SIB and the Financial Advisors Who Marketed SIB’s CDs to Potential Investors.
The liquidators are emphatic that financial advisors who marketed and sold SIB’s CD’s to potential investors were not, in fact, agents of SIB.¬† Rather, “they operated individually under management agreements with SIB, or were employed by other Stanford companies which had management agreements with SIB . . . .¬† These advisors worked for Stanford related entities all over the world, including Antigua, Aruba, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Switzerland, and Venezuela, as well as in the United States . . . . All of the financial advisors marketed the CDs but none had authority to contract on behalf of SIB . . . . Further, Liquidators understand that the financial advisors sold other Stanford-related products besides SIB CDs.”¬† Those advisors who were located in the US ‘worked for an entity called the Stanford Group Companies (“SGC”), and though they marketed SIB CDs to potential depositors, they were not agents of SIB.’”
Put succinctly, the liquidators’ argument is that an international network of independent sales agents does not create the sort of “agency” that would alter cross-border COMI analysis under US law: “[US] Courts analyzing similar circumstances have consistently held that a company’s COMI or its principal place of business is in the jurisdiction where its operations are conducted even if the company has sales representatives in other jurisdictions.”
The “Single Business Enterprise” Concept as Part of the “Alter Ego” Theory of Imposing Liability.
¬†Finally, the liquidators argue that SIB is neither part of a “single business enterprise” nor an “alter ego” of other Stanford entities or of Stanford’s senior managers¬†- and their respective “principal place[s] of business” in the US cannot be imputed to SIB for purposes of determining SIB’s COMI.¬† This is so, according to Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith, because:
- The doctrine of “single business enterprise” liability is a particular creature of Texas law – which, in addition to being inapplicable to an Antiguan-chartered international bank such as SIB, is itself no longer viable even in Texas.¬† See SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 456(Tex. 2008) (rejecting the theory because Texas law does not “support the imposition of one corporation’s obligations on another” as permitted by the theory); see also Acceptance Indemn. Ins. Co. v. Maltez, No. 08-20288, 2009 WL 2748201, at *5 (5th Cir. June 30, 2009) (unpublished) (recognizing the holding of Gladstrong).
- The doctrine of “alter ego” does not apply because its primary use is to permit corporate creditors to “pierce the corporate veil” and seek recourse from the corporation’s parent or individual shareholders.¬† Here, the liquidators argue, Mr. Janvey is attempting to pierce the corporate veil in the opposite direction:¬† He is attempting to permit creditors of a corporate parent or individual principals to seek recourse from a distinct and separate foreign subsidiary.¬† Such “reverse veil piercing” is properly obtained (if at all) through the “extreme and unsual” remedy of substantive consolidation through bankruptcy.¬† However, liquidation of the Stanford entities through a federal bankruptcy proceeding is something Mr. Janvey has, to date,¬†”studiously avoided.”
- The equitable purposes of the “alter ego” doctrine would be frustrated in this case.¬† The “injustice” that “alter ego” relief is designed to reverse would, in fact,¬†only be furthered where SIB investors would see their recoveries diluted by creditors of other Stanford entities.
Mr. Janvey’s response is due December 17.
Monday, November 16th, 2009
As readers of this blog are aware, Antiguan liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith and federal receiver Ralph Janvey have been busy in several forums battling for control of the financial assets previously controlled by Allen Stanford, including Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB).¬† Prior posts are accessible here.
Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith have filed numerous pleadings from other courts in support of their pending request, before US District Court Judge David Godbey, for recognition of their liquidation of SIB as a “main case” under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code.
Mr. Janvey has recently filed his own copies of several recent rulings.¬† These include a ruling in which the Quebec Superior Court’s¬†Mr. Justice Claude Auclair found that Vantis Business Recovery Services – a division of British accounting, tax, and advisory firm Vantis plc, and the firm through which Messr’s. Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith were appointed liquidators for SIB – should be removed from receivership of SIB’s Canadian operations.
More recently, Mr. Janvey has filed a copy of a recently unsealed plea agreement between Stanford affiliate James Davis and federal prosecutors.
Mr. Janvey’s papers provide a glimpse into Davis’ relationship with Stanford, and into the origins of SIB.¬† Summarized briefly:
- Davis’ and Stanford’s relationship dates back to the late 1980s, when Stanford retained Davis to act as the controller for then-Montserrat-based Guardian International Bank, Ltd.¬† Davis’ plea agreement recites that Stanford had Davis falsify the bank’s revenues and portfolio balances for banking regulators.¬† Continued regulatory scrutiny in Montserrat eventually led to Stanford’s closure of Guardian and removal of its banking operations to Antigua – where, in 1990, it resumed operations under the name of Stanford International Bank, Ltd.
- SIB and a “web of other affiliated financial services companies” operated under the corporate umbrella of Stanford Financial Group.¬† SIB’s primary function was to market supposedly safe and liquid “certificates of deposit” (CDs).¬† By 2008, SIB had sold nearly $7 billion of them to investors worldwide.
- Davis’ plea agreement further recites that investors were assured SIB’s operations were subject to scrutiny by the Antiguan Financial Services Regulatory Commission (FSRC), and to independent, outside audits.
SIB’s Asset Allocation and Operations
- In fact, SIB investor funds were neither safe nor secure.¬† According to Davis’ plea agreement, investor funds did not go into the marketed CDs.¬† Instead, they were placed into three general “tiers”: (i) cash and cash equivalents (“Tier I”); (ii) investments managed by outside advisors (“Tier II”); and (iii) “other” investments (“Tier III”).¬† By 2008, the majority of SIB’s investor funds – approximately 80% – were¬†held in “highly illiquid real and personal property” in “Tier III,”¬†including $2 billion in “undisclosed, unsecured personal loans” to Allen Stanford.¬† A further 10% was held in “Tier II.”¬†¬†The remaining 10% balance was presumably held in “Tier I.”
- Likewise, SIB’s operations were not subject to any meaningful scrutiny.¬† Davis’ plea agreement recites that in or about 2002, Stanford introduced him to Leroy King, a former Bank of America executive and Antiguan ambassador to the US, and soon-to-be Chief Executive Officer of the FSRC.¬† Stanford, King, and another FSRC employee responsible for regulatory oversight performed a “blood oath” brotherhood ceremony sometime in 2003 – ostensibly to cement their commitment to one another and King’s commitment to the protection of SIB – i.e., to “ensure that Antiguan bank regulators would not ‘kill [SIB's] business’” in Antigua.
- Though blood may be thicker than water, it is not thicker than cash: Stanford’s and King’s “brotherhood” was cemented further by bribes paid to King for his protection of SIB.¬† Acccording to Davis’ plea agreement, these bribes ultimately exceeded $200,000.¬† In return for this largesse, King reassigned two overly inqusitive Antiguan examiners of which Stanford complained sometime in 2003.¬† In 2005 and again in 2006, King further cooperated with Stanford in providing misleading responses to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s inquiries to the FSRC, in which the SEC divulged to the FSRC that it had evidence of SIB’s involvement in a¬†”possible Ponzi scheme.”¬† King and Stanford similarly collaborated in responding to a 2006 inquiry by the Director of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank’s Bank Supervision Department regarding SIB’s affiliate relationship with the Bank of Antigua.
SIB’s Financial Reporting
- A central premise of Stanford’s approach to soliciting investments – and, perhaps understandably, a central point of interest for would-be investors¬†- was that SIB must show a profit each year.¬† To accomplish this, Davis and Stanford reportedly initially determined false revenue numbers for SIB.¬† Ultimately, this collaboration gave rise to a fabricated annual “budget” for SIB, which would show financial growth.¬† Using these “budgeted” growth numbers, Stanford accounting employees working in St. Croix would generate artificial revenues (and resulting artificial ROIs), which were then transmitted to Stanford’s Chief Accounting Officer in Houston and ultimately to Davis in Mississippi for final adjustment and approval before making their way back to the Caribbean for reporting to SIB investors.
- According to Davis’ plea agreement, “[t]his continued routine false reporting . . . created an ever-widening hole between reported assets and actual liabilities, causing the creation of a massive Ponzi scheme . . . .¬† By the end of 2008, [SIB reported] that it held over $7 billion in assets, when in truth . . . [SIB] actually held less than $2 billion in assets.”
- In about mid-2008, Stanford, Davis, and others attempted to plug this “hole” created by converting a $65 million real estate transaction in Antigua into a $3.2 billion asset of SIB through a “series of related party property flips through business entities controlled by Stanford.”
SEC Subpoenas and SIB’s Insolvency
- By early 2009, the SEC had issued subpoenas related to SIB’s investment portfolio.¬† At a February meeting held in advance of SEC testimony, Stanford management determined that SIB’s “Tier II” assets were then valued at approximately $350 million – down from $850 million in mid-2008.¬† Management further determined that¬† and¬†SIB’s “Tier III” assets consisted of (i) real estate acquired for less than $90 million earlier in the year, but now valued at more than $3 billion; (ii) $1.6 billion in “loans” to Stanford; and (iii) other private equity investments.¬† Davis’ plea agreement recites that at that same meeting, and despite the apparent disparity between actual and reported asset values, Stanford insisted that SIB had “‘at least $850 million more in assets than liabilities.’”¬† In a separate meeting later that day, however, Stanford reportedly acknowledged that SIB’s “assets and financial health had been misrepresented to investors, and were overstated in [SIB's] financials.”
Janvey doesn’t describe exactly how these acknowledged facts integrate into his prior opposition to the Antiguan liquidators’ request for recognition.¬† His prior pleadings have questioned indirectly the integrity of the Antiguan wind-up proceedings; consequently, Mr. King’s role in protecting SIB under the auspices of the Antiguan FSRC may well be the point.¬† Likewise, Janvey may point to the US-based control and direction of financial reporting manipulations that ultimately created a $5 billion “hole” in SIB’s asset structure as evidence of the American origin of SIB’s allegedly fraudulent operations.¬† Or the filing may be intended to blunt the effect of a previously filed detention order – issued by another US District Court and affirmed by the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals – confining Stanford to the US and observing that his ties to Texas were “tenuous at best.”
It remains for Judge Godbey to determine whether – and in what way and to what degree – Davis’ plea agreement impacts on the liquidators’ request for a determination that SIB’s “center of main interests” remains in Antigua.
For the moment, the parties await his decision.
Monday, October 19th, 2009
Postings on this blog have focused on the cross-border battle between¬†Antiguan liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith and federal receiver Ralph Janvey for control of the financial assets previously controlled by Sir Allen Stanford, including Stanford International Bank, Ltd.¬†(SIB).¬† A complete digest of prior posts is available here.
Mr. Janvey, meanwhile,¬†has had to address yet another challenge to his receivership -¬†from investors seeking to commence an involuntary Chapter 7 case.¬† In early September, an ad hoc group of CD and deposit-holders fronted by Dr. Samuel Bukrinsky, Jaime Alexis Arroyo Bornstein, and Mario Gebel requested an expedited hearing on their request for leave to commence an involuntary bankruptcy against the Stanford entities.
The ad hoc investor group’s September request was not their first: In May of this year, the same investors requested essentially the same relief.¬† That request was never acted on, presumably because presiding US District Court Judge David Godbey already had imposed a 6-month moratorium on interference with the receivership.
With the moratorium’s expiration, the investors¬†have raised the issue once again.
A Receivership Run Wild?
Their¬†second request largely repeats the investors’¬†prior arguments, many of them rather personal: No one is happy with the way this receivership has been run, they claim.¬† Specifically, the receivership is far too expensive and the lack of meaningful participation deprives creditors of significant due process rights.¬† Instead, an involuntary liquidation under Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code is the best and most efficient means of reining in expenses and preserving those rights.¬† The investors’ brief¬†offers a picture of the 21st century Stanford receivership more closely resembling Dickens’¬†19th century “Bleak House”: Professional fees accruing at an “alarming” rate (in this case, an estimated $1.1M per week);¬†an estate at risk of being consumed entirely by administrative costs; and investors ultimately twice victimized.
The investors further argue that an injunction prohibiting creditors’ access to the US bankruptcy system is, at best, an interim measure.¬† As such, it can never be employed¬†on a permanent basis¬†- and, therefore, cannot survive the standards for injunctive relief articulated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¬† They cite a variety of decisions which stand – according to them – for the proposition that the US Bankruptcy Court offers the best forum for complex liquidations such as the one at hand.
Creditors Who Don’t Know What’s Best For Them?
Predictably, Mr. Janvey disagrees in the strongest terms.
As he sees it (and as he sees a string of federal cases referenced in his response), a federal equity receivership – and not a federal bankruptcy proceeding – is the accepted, “decades-long practice” of federal courts in winding up entities that were the subject of alleged Ponzi schemes and other frauds.¬† Moreover, Mr. Janvey suggests that if creditors are dissatisfied with the expense and claimed inefficiency of this proceeding, transition to a liquidation under the US Bankruptcy Code would be even more so.¬† In support, Mr. Janvey offers a “parade of horribles,” such as the “procedural nightmare” involved in transitioning much of the complex litigation already underway in the receivership to a bankruptcy trustee’s administration, the likely existence of multiple creditors’ committees (and the attendant expense of their counsel), and the need to sort out¬†the Antiguans liquidators’¬†competing Chapter 15 recognition request even if a Chapter 7 petition is filed.
Perhaps most significantly, however, Mr. Janvey believes that flexibility regarding a plan of distribution should govern the administration of the Stanford matters:
Like the¬†Bankruptcy Code, equity receiverships ensure that persons similarly situated receive similar treatment. In a case such as this involving massive deception, however, a searching evaluation of the facts is required to discern relevant differences between and among categories of creditors. Unlike a trustee in bankruptcy, the Receiver can take into account relative fault within a class of creditors, and fashion an equitable plan of distribution that does not treat all creditors within a class identically if they are not deserving of equal treatment.
Mr. Janvey does not develop how a receiver’s application of equitable principles¬†might differ from the equitable and other subordination provisions of Bankruptcy Code section 510.¬† Ultimately, his response reduces itself to a simple proposition for Judge Godbey and for creditors:
Unfortunately, Messr’s. Bukrinsky,¬†Bornstein, and¬†Gebel do not.¬† Their reply brief¬†- submitted last Friday – again reiterates that the Stanford receivership has outlived its usefulness in¬†this highly complex insolvency.¬† According to them, the Stanford record speaks for itself.¬† It is time for¬†a new regime.
Like the liquidators’ request for US recognition of their Antiguan-based wind-up of SIB, the parties now await Judge Godbey’s decision.
Tuesday, June 16th, 2009
This blog has intermittently followed the Texas-sized contest for control over now-defunct financial and investment entities once operated by Sir Allen Stanford.¬† That contest has pitted Antiguan liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith against federal receiver Ralph Janvey.¬† Prior posts are located here, here, and here.
Approximately one month ago, US District Judge David Godbey permitted Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith to commence a Chapter 15 case on behalf of Stanford International Bank (SIB), headquartered in Antigua.¬†¬†A hearing regarding the liquidators’ request for¬†US recognition of SIB’s liquidation is tentatively calendared for mid-July.¬† The parties have submitted a joint status report and have also filed further briefing on the question of the Stanford entities’ “Center of Main Interests” (COMI) -¬†which the parties believe will¬†determine the location of¬†a “main proceeding” for the¬†Stanford entities, and will further determine what (if any)¬†recognition US courts will give that proceeding.
Briefing and evidence submitted to date provides a preview of the parties’ positions, as well as on the issues that the Judge Janvey will need to address:
- COMI.¬† A supplemental¬†affidavit submitted by Mr. Hamilton-Smith in support of recognition appears to stress both (i) SIB’s corporate separation from other Stanford entities; and (ii) its function as the effective “nerve center” of global Stanford investment operations.¬† In¬†a 50-page response to the Liquidators’ petition for recognition, Mr. Janvey argues that (i) the Stanford entities’ principal interests, assets, and management are not in Antigua; (ii) SIB was a mere “shell” for a fraudulent scheme¬†headquarted in, and implemented from, the US; and (iii) COMI is the location from which the fraud emanates, and not from the location where investors have been duped into believing a legitimate business was run.¬† And lest we forget matters of policy,¬†the Receiver offers the somewhat conclusory arguments that because a receivership (rather than a bank liquidation) is the appropriate means of investigating a fraud, because the Antiguan government is somehow too close to this liquidation, and because the liquidators have allegedly attempted to “end run” the Receivership by obtaining a recognition order in Canada (an allegation bitterly contested by the Antiguan Liquidators), recognition of a Chapter 15 would be against public policy.¬† A concurrent response filed by the SEC largely concurs in these arguments.¬† The SEC appears to rely heavily on the US citizenship of Mr. Stanford and most members of his board of directors (in fact, “Sir Allen” holds joint US-Antiguan citizenship), the purported location of management¬†decisions (according to the SEC, within the US), and the comparative dollar volume of¬†SIB investment sales in the US¬†as the primary basis for opposing the request to recognize SIB’s Antiguan liquidation as the “main proceeding.”
- Substantive Consolidation?¬† The parties’ briefs to date raise the issue of substantive consolidation (or “aggregation”).¬† The Liquidators advise Judge Godbey that they expect the Receiver to argue in support of substantive consolidation of the Stanford entities.¬† Mr. Janvey never directly addresses his position on substantive consolidation, calling it a “bankruptcy question” which is appropriate only in the event that multiple Stanford entities find themselves in bankruptcy in the US (a possibility triggered by filings briefly mentioned below).¬† However, Janvey goes on to reiterate his position that the Stanford entities must be treated as part of a single, integrated receivership, since the Stanford entities operated as a single “integrated network.”
- Involuntary Proceedings?¬† The parties’ joint status report mentions a request by certain investors for permission to file involuntary bankruptcies in the US against one or more of the Stanford entities.¬† That request has been opposed by the Receiver, who argues that rather than bankruptcy, a federal receivership (i) is really the best way to adminsiter an alleged Ponzi scheme; (ii)¬†protects creditors’ and investors’ due process (and bankruptcy doesn’t?!);¬†and¬†(iii) provides the maximum degree of flexibility, essential to the equitable relief and redress this case requires.¬† The Examiner disagrees with the Receiver, suggesting that Judge Godbey can – and, indeed,¬†should – evaluate the relative merits of a bankruptcy (rather than a receivership) for the Stanford entities, but cautions that the investors must demonstrate the relative benefits of such a proceeding vis √° vis a receivership.
- Cooperation?¬† In a now-familiar refrain, the Receiver and the Antiguan Liquidators blame each other for failing to cooperate, all the while holding out their own respective proposed cooperation schemes.¬† Mr. Hamilton-Smith’s affidavit (mentioned above) proposes a general framework of cooperation in the event that a request for recognition of SIB’s liquidation is approved.¬† The same investors seeking permission to commence an involuntary proceeding (also mentioned above) argue that, in fact, Chapter 15 provides the best¬†vehicle for¬†cross-border coordination no matter where the “center of main interests” is ultimately determined.
Further briefing – and some decisions – are due later in the month.
Overall, it’s shaping up to be a hot summer in Texas.
Monday, May 25th, 2009
Last week’s¬†blog post (here)¬†covered early skirmishing between SEC receiver Ralph Janvey and Antiguan liqudators Nigel Hamilton-Smith and Peter Wastell over control of the assets and business entities once operated by Sir Allen Stanford – and which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleges¬†furthered an elaborate international Ponzi scheme.¬†¬†Court pleadings describing the Stanford entities, the alleged Ponzi scheme, and the federal receivership instituted at the¬†SEC’s behest¬†are available here.
Readers of last week’s post may recall that¬†the primary bone of contention between Janvey and his Antiguan counterparts was whether or not the Antiguans – Messr’s. Nigel Hamilton-Smith and Wastell – should be permitted to¬†seek American recognition of their liquidation of Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB) while a US receivership of Stanford assets (including SIB, and superintended by Janvey) remains pending in Dallas’s¬†U.S. District Court.¬† The Antiguan liquidators requested that District Court Judge David Godbey permit them to seek recognition.¬† The receiver, supported by the SEC (and joined by the IRS), objected.
Judge Godbey’s response was immediately forthcoming.¬† In a short, 5-page Order issued late last Friday, he authorized the liquidators’ request and modified his prior receivership Order to permit the liquidators to commence a Chapter 15 proceeding and¬†seek recognition of their Antiguan liquidation.
Two things are worth noting about¬†Judge Godbey’s¬†Order.¬† First, the mere authorization to seek recognition is no guarantee recognition will be granted.¬† While recognizing the Congressional intent behind¬†Chapter 15 (i.e., greater international cooperation, greater certainty for trade and investment, fair and efficient administration, etc.), Judge Godbey nevertheless directed the parties to confer regarding a process by which to determine whether the Antiguan liquidation should be recognized.¬† The Court no doubt anticipates what the Examiner has already identified: a looming fight over¬†SIB’s eligibility for Chapter 15 relief.¬† More specifically, the parties will provide evidence on the question of whether SIB is a “foreign bank” with a “branch” or “agency” in the US – and, therefore, ineligible for Chapter 15 recognition under Section 1501(c)(1) (which incorporates Section 109(b) by reference).¬†
Second, where recognition is appropriate, a prior post asked whether¬†Judge Godbey might not use his broad discretion under Chatper 15 to fashion and direct the mutual cooperation that Congress envisioned – but that to date, has apparently slipped from the parties’ view.¬† Judge Godbey’s Order¬†suggests that where SIB’s liquidation can be recognized,¬†he may do so: In a brief acknowledgement his own broad discretion, Judge Godbey’s Order notes that “[a]s a practical matter, the mechanism of Chapter 15 is precisely designed to effect coordination between entities like the Antiguan Liquidators and the Receiver.”
Meanwhile, the Antiguan liquidators and the receiver have until May 29 to confer, jointly prepare, and submit a status report outlining a proposed procedure for moving forward with the request for recognition.
The devil, as they say, is in the details.
Saturday, May 16th, 2009
A¬†prior post on¬†this blog mapped out the field of combat in the brewing battle between SEC receiver Ralph Janvey and Antiguan liqudators Nigel Hamilton-Smith and Peter Wastell for control of the now-defunct financial empire of Sir Allen Stanford, the native Texan who acceded to Antiguan knighthood¬†but who now stands accused of running an alleged¬†world-wide Ponzi scheme.
That battle has now commenced.
To review, the Securities and Exchange Commission obtained appointment of a receiver for Stanford’s assets and the Antiguan government appointed liquidators for Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB) within 3 days of one another.¬† The Receiver’s and the liquidators’ initial attempts to cooperate¬†degenerated into a battle for control over global efforts to marshal assets and make distributions to creditors.
The parties recently brought their disputes before the US District Court in Dallas, where Judge David Godbey must now decide (i) whether his previously-issued receivership order (which prohibited the commencement of any bankruptcy proceeding during the pendency of the SEC receviership) should be modified to permit the liquidators’ commencement of a Chapter 15 case regarding SIB; and (ii) whether the Chapter 15 proceedings (if any) ought to be referred back to the Dallas bankruptcy court (itself a division of the District Court).
A hearing on these disputes has yet to be scheduled.¬† However, the parties have put forth the following arguments (to see the parties’ respective briefs, click on¬†each applicable party’s name):
- The US Government.¬† The federal government – and more specifically, the SEC and the Internal Revenue Service¬†- oppose the commencement of a Chapter 15.¬†¬†
The IRS complains that doing so will disrupt its efforts to litigate tax claims against Sir Allen.¬† In essence, the IRS trusts Judge Godbey’s ability to facilitate this litigation more than it does the Antiguan court system.¬† It also warns that the Antiguan liquidation scheme will not respect the IRS’s asserted tax liens against Stanford’s assets – including SIB assets – and will not sufficiently protect US taxpayers and investors.
The SEC, in an argument that appears somewhat circular, reminds Judge Godbey that he originally imposed a stay on extraneous litigation in connection with the receivership; therefore, that stay ought not to be modified because . . . to do so would¬†countenance extraneous litigation.
In a footnote, the SEC signals its willingness to appeal an adverse ruling by noting that where the receivership order has already been appealed by other third parties, Judge Godbey is without jurisdiction to make any further amendments to it – but must instead preserve the status quo.¬† At a substantive level, the SEC intimates that the¬†pre-liquidation relationship between SIB and the Antiguan goverment was overly cozy and that because SIB lent over US$100 million to the Antiguan government (and holds approximately $84 million in receivables payable by the Antiguan government), the Antiguan court’s judgment (and, by extension, that of the liquidators) in handling the Antiguan liquidation is not to be trusted.¬† At an equitable level, the SEC argues that the Antiguan liquidators may not urge the Antiguan courts to ignore the SEC’s receivership, then request that Judge Godbey recognize their liquidation.
- The Receiver.¬†¬†Mr.¬†Janvey¬†- himself acting as the arm of the District Court’s equitable jurisdiction¬†- argues that¬†the Court’s¬†exclusive control over the Stanford entities through his receivership is . . . well, equitable.¬†
Janvey’s 24-page brief is generally consistent with that of the SEC and, in the end, reduces itself to the¬†old adage that “there are too many cooks in the kitchen”:¬†It accuses Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith of grabbing for control of substantially all of the¬†Stanford entities’¬†assets through their administration of one Stanford entity, of attempting to “end run” the Texas receivership through a Canadian proceeding, of standing idly by while the Antiguan government seeks to appropriate Antiguan real estate otherwise available for general creditors’ benefit, and of generally hampering the Receiver’s job.
Mr. Janvey further argues there is nothing to preclude the District Court from exercising its very broad equitable powers to enjoin a Chapter 15 proceeding.
- The Examiner.¬† In¬†a thoughtful brief, John Little – an Examiner appointed by Judge Godbey to assist him in running the receivership – advises the Court that, in fact, it is a good idea to first permit the commencement of a Chapter 15 case, then to address the validity of the Antiguan liquidators’ requests for recogntion on their own legal and factual merits.
Essentially, Mr. Little, while not disagreeing that a District Court sitting in equity has broad discretion, suggests that Judge Godbey utilize that discretion to grant the liquidators’ request, then¬†determine (i) whether¬†Messr’s. Hamilton-Smith’s and Wastell’s request for recognition is viable or otherwise impermissible on the grounds that¬†SIB is a “foreign bank,”¬†ineligible for Chapter 15¬†relief; and (ii) if recognition applies, whether SIB’s “center of main interests” is Antigua, or elsewhere.
- The Liquidators.¬† Messr’s. Hamilton-Smith and Wastell call the Receiver’s and the SEC’s mud-slinging exactly what it is . . . then waste precious little time in slinging their own.
In a number of reprises, all of which¬†end in the same refrain – “The Pot is Calling the Kettle Black” – the Antiguan liquidators bristle with indignance at the misconduct alleged of them, accuse Mr. Janvey and his federal government allies of misstating both the facts and the law, and point out that many of the “parade of horribles” supposedly arising in Antiguan insolvency proceedings apply with equal force (or much worse) in US-based federal equitable receiverships.
They note, for example, that Judge Godbey’s refusal to entertain a request for recognition will do nothing to prohibit courts with Stanford-related insolvency proceedings now pending in the UK, Switzerland, and Canada from refusing the same recogntion to Mr. Janvey – and will therefore fail to accomplish the global administration and control Mr. Janvey seeks.¬† Likewise, the IRS’s complaint that Antiguan insolvency proceedings do not embrace a priority scheme analogous to the US Bankruptcy Code strikes Messr’s. Hamilton-Smith and Wastell as ironic, since the distribution that arises under a federal receivership is entirely arbitrary, and effectively outside any statutory distribution scheme (including the US Bankruptcy Code’s).¬†
Amidst the name-calling and the attempts to find precedent in a federal receivership which appears, by all accounts, to be one of first impression, it may be easy to miss the importance – and the potential – of the wide discretion provided to the US District Court¬†in Chapter 15.
This discretion appears in at least two ways.
First, a US Court applying Chapter 15 is generally free to communicate and coordinate insolvency proceedings directly with courts of other jurisdictions.¬† Prior to Chapter 15′s enactment, it was common practice for separate courts administering a multi-national insolvency to confer directly by means of “protocols” specifically designed for the purpose of administering the case at hand.¬† These “protocols” – often individually negotiated for a specific case – facilitated adminsitration and helped coordinate the rulings of various courts for maximum efficiency and uniformity.¬† Much of this former practice lives on in Chapter 15: Section 1525 specifically codifies and authorizes it, while Section 1527 lists several, non-exclusive means of such cooperation.¬†¬†
Second, US Courts applying Chapter 15 have broad discretion to grant, modify, or otherwise tailor relief for foreign representatives, thereby shaping the administration of a foreign case inside the US.¬† Though certain types of relief are “automatic” upon recognition of a foreign “main” case, Section 1522 permits a court to “modify or terminate” much of the relief available to foreign representatives on its own motion, and in a manner which protects all of the entities involved.
How might a Chapter 15 proceeding alleviate some of the rancor that has developed between Mr. Janvey and his Antiguan counterparts?
Perhaps some coordination and cooperation of the sort envisioned by the Bankruptcy Code – for example, web conferencing between judges in Antigua, the UK, the US, Canada, and Switzerland designed to develop a “Stanford protocol” within the context of Chapter 15′s provisions and foster unified worldwide administration of the Stanford cases¬†- would¬†go some distance toward¬†establishing the judicial “end game” that preserves the integrity of the federal receivership process and of the foreign insolvency proceedings.
Along the way,¬†the same cooperation might further demonstrate the remarkable flexibility of Chapter 15.¬† And who knows?¬† It might prevent all of the cooks in the kitchen from hitting one another with blackened pots . . .¬†thereby preserving a little more for Stanford’s creditors and investors.
Monday, April 27th, 2009
When a foreign representative meets a federal receiver, who’s ultimately in charge?¬† And in charge of what?
The US Bankruptcy Code’s cross-border provisions were enacted by Congress to foster “cooperation between (A) courts of the United States, United States trustees, trustees, examiners, debtors and debtors in possession; and (B) the courts and other competent authorities of foreign countries involved in cross-border insolvency cases.”¬† The same provisions were also intended to promote “greater legal certainty for [international] trade and investment.”
To this end, Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth relatively simple, straightforward requirements necessary for foreign representatives to obtain recognition of a “foreign proceeding,” and provides further that once such recognition is granted, US courts “shall grant comity or cooperation to the foreign representative.”¬† But the same chapter also provides that the recognizing US court may “modify or terminate” the relief otherwise available by statute to a foreign representative where the interests of creditors and the debtor “are sufficiently protected.”
These policy objectives – along with the Code’s cross-border provisions – are about to undergo a Texas-sized test next month, where a federal receiver appointed in Dallas to marshal the assets of Sir Allan Stanford’s Stanford Financial Group and other, related companies is wrangling with liquidators appointed for Antiguan affiliate Stanford International Bank, Ltd. – the entity that issued¬†”certificates of deposit”¬†purchased by investors in an alleged $8 billion, world-wide¬†Ponzi scheme.
The case is likely to offer important insight into how federal courts will reconcile¬†their equitable perogatives in other, non-bankruptcy insolvency proceedings (such as federal receiverships) with the Bankruptcy Code’s cross-border insolvency provisions.
In late February, the Securities and Exchange Commission sought a Temporary Restraining Order and immediate appointment of a receiver for the US-based assets of Stanford Financial Group (SFG) and related companies to stop an alleged¬†”massive, ongoing fraud orchestrated . . . through . . . Antiguan-based Stanford International Bank, Ltd. and its affiliated Houston-based financial advisors . . . .”
Upon US District Court Judge David Godbey’s grant of a TRO, Dallas attorney Ralph Janvey was appointed Receiver.¬† Very shortly thereafter, Antiguan regulators placed Stanford¬†International Bank,¬†Ltd.¬†(SIB) into liquidation and¬†appointed Nigel Hamilton-Smith and Peter Wastell as liquidators.
All the parties acknowledge that there were at least initial efforts to reach cooperative arrangements regarding the administration of the concurrent liquidation proceedings.¬† Unfortunately, these efforts apparently went nowhwere.
In mid-March, Janvey’s counsel requested an amendment of the District Court’s receivership order so as to provide Janvey with the exclusive power to commence any federal bankruptcy proceeding (including the prohibition of any petition for recogntion by any other party without prior Court order) and¬†to act as “foreign representative” in non-US courts on the companies’ behalf.¬† The proposed Order further left such arrangements in place for approximately 6 months.
Judge Godbey granted the motion, which was unopposed – but struck provisions of the Order that would designate Janvey as a “foreign representative” in non-US proceedings.
Last Monday, Hamilton-Smith and Wastell sought recognition under Chapter 15 before Judge Godbey and requested (i) a further amendment of Janvey’s already-amended receivership order so as to remove the prohibition against their commencement of a Chapter 15 case; and (ii) referral of the Chapter 15 case to the US Bankruptcy Court.
In papers supporting their requests, the English liquidators essentially argue that the receivership order is unenforceable insofar as it purports to restrict the commencement of a Chapter 15 case – and that the District Court simply may not enjoin such a filing.¬† Hamilton-Smith and Wastell claim further that Janvey has attempted – improperly and, apparently, without success – to interpose himself into the Antiguan liquidation and to have himself appointed as liquidator in that proceeding as well as in the US receivership.¬†¬† Predictably, Hamilton-Smith and Wastell also devote significant attention to establishing Antigua as the “center of main interests” for SIB’s Antiguan liquidation.
Mr. Janvey has yet to respond.¬† But he provided some indication of what that response will be in a 58-page Interim Report filed last Thursday.¬† In it, Janvey claims that SIB is an asset of the Receivership estate, since it was owned by¬†Sir Allan¬†Stanford on the date the receivership was instituted.¬† According to Mr. Janvey, his efforts to intervene in the Antiguan liquidation were rebuffed by the Antiguan court on the grounds that the receivership had no effect in Antigua, and that Janvey was therefore not an interested party to the liquidation.¬† Janvey further accuses Hamilton-Smith and Wastell of obtaining a Canadian registrar’s order recognizing them as the “foreign representatives” for SIB within the contemplation of Canadian insolvency law . . . all with no prior notice to him.
Not surprisingly, Janvey believes the US¬†- and not Antigua – constitutes the “center of main interests” for these cases, and that his receivership, rather than the Antiguan liquidation,¬†ought to be deemed the “main” or primary insolvency proceeding.
Can a federal court, acting within a federal receivership,¬†interpose its own additional barriers upon the Bankruptcy Code’s relatively minimal requirements for obtaining recognition of a foreign insolvency?¬† Can foreign representatives, once they have obtained recogntion for a foreign proceeding, demand and expect “comity” from any US court in aid of their own insolvency objectives, regardless of that court’s ongoing efforts to administer an insolvent estate?¬† Or can¬†that court modifiy the relief otherwise available to suit its own pre-existing administrative scheme for the same estate?¬† Can a federal court utilize its equitable powers to institute a receivership that will administer world-wide assets, claims, and recovery actions?¬† Or can the Court instead use similarly broad¬†discretion to fashion and direct the mutual cooperation that, to date, has eluded Messr’s. Janvey, Hamilton-Smith, and Wastell?
This is a matter well worth watching.
Judge Godbey has scheduled briefing¬†on the Antiguan liquidators’ requests into early May.¬† Copies of the SEC’s¬†papers in support of the TRO, the District Court’s¬†amended receivership order, the liquidators’ notice of Chapter 15 case, motion to amend the receivership order, and papers in support of the motion to refer matters to the Bankruptcy Court¬†. . . and the receiver’s interim report¬†. . . are all available here.