Posts Tagged ‘“real estate”’
Tuesday, June 7th, 2011
Chapter 11 practice â like so many other professional service specialties â is regrettably jargon-laden.Â Businesses that need to get their financial affairs in order âenter restructuring.âÂ Those that must re-negotiate their debt obligations attempt to âde-leverage.âÂ And those facing resistance in doing so seek the aid of Bankruptcy Courts in âcramming downâ their plans over creditor opposition.
Likewise, the Bankruptcy Code â and, consequently, Bankruptcy Courts â employ what can seem an entirely separate vocabulary for describing the means by which a successful âcram-downâ is achieved.Â One such means involves providing the secured creditor with something which equals the value of its secured claim: If the secured creditor holds a security interest in the debtorâs apple, for example, the debtor may simply give the creditor the apple â or may even attempt to replace the creditorâs interest in the apple with a similarÂ interest in the debtorâs orange (provided, of course, that the orange is worth as much as the original apple).
The concept of replacing something of value belonging to a secured creditor with something else of equivalent value is known in âbankruptcy-eseâ as providing the creditor with the âindubitable equivalentâ of its claim â and it is a concept employed perhaps most frequently in cases involving real estate assets (though âindubitable equivalenceâ is not limited to interests in real estate).Â For this reason, plans employing this concept in the real estate context are sometimes referred to as âdirt for debtâ plans.
A recent bankruptcy decision out of Georgiaâs Northern District issued earlier this year illustrates the challenges of âdirt for debtâ reorganizations based on the concept of âindubitable equivalence.â
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Green Hobson Riddle, Jr., a Georgia businessman, farmer, and real estate investor, sought protection in Chapter 11 after economic difficulties left him embroiled in litigation and unable to service his obligations.
Mr. Riddleâs proposed plan of reorganization, initially opposed by a number of his creditors, went through five iterations until only one objecting creditor â Northside Bank â remained.Â Northside Bank held a first-priority secured claim worth approximately $907,000 secured by approximately 36 acres of real property generally referred to as the âHighway 411/Dodd Blvd Property,â and a second-priority claim secured by a condominium unit generally referred to as the âHeritage Square Property.âÂ It also held a judgment lien recorded against Mr. Riddle in Floyd County, Georgia.
A key feature of Mr. Riddleâs plan involved freeing up the Heritage Square Property in order refinance one of his companies, thereby generating additional payments for his creditors.Â To do this, Mr. Riddle proposed to give Northside Bank his Highway 411/Dodd Blvd Property as the âindubitable equivalent,â and in satisfaction, of all of Northsideâs claims.
Northside Bank objected to this treatment, respectfully disagreeing with Mr. Riddleâs idea of âindubitable equivalence.âÂ Bankruptcy Judge Paul Bonapfel took evidence on the issue and â in a brief, 9-page decision â found that Mr. Riddle had the better end of the argument.
Judge Bonapfelâs decision highlights several key features of âindubitable equivalentâ plans:
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The importance of valuation.Â The real challenge of an âindubitable equivalenceâ plan is not its vocabulary.Â It is valuing the property which will be given to the creditor so as to demonstrate that value is âtoo evident to be doubted.âÂ As anyone familiar with valuation work is aware, this is far more easily said than done.Â Valuation becomes especially important where the debtor is proposing to give the creditor something less than all of the collateral securing the creditorâs claim, as Mr. Riddle did in his case.Â In such circumstances, the valuation must be very conservative â a consideration Judge Bonapfel and other courts recognized.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The importance of evidentiary standards.Â Closely related to the idea of being âtoo evident to be doubtedâ is the question of what evidentiary standards apply to the valuation.Â Some courts have held that because the propertyâs value must be âtoo evident to be doubted,â the evidence of value must be âclear and convincingâ (the civil equivalent of âbeyond a reasonable doubtâ).Â More recent cases, however, weigh the âpreponderance of evidenceâ (i.e., does the evidence indicate something more than a 50% probability that the property is worth what itâs claimed to be?).Â As one court (confusingly) put it: âThe level of proof to show âindubitablyâ is not raised merely by the use of the word âindubitable.ââÂ Rather than require more or better evidence, many courts seem to focus instead on the conservative nature of the valuation and its assumptions.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The importance of a legitimate reorganization purpose.Â Again, where a creditor is receiving something less than the entirety of its collateral as the âindubitable equivalentâ of its claim, it is up to the debtor to show that such treatment is for the good of all the creditors â and not merely to disadvantage the creditor in question.Â Judge Bonapfel put this issue front and center when he noted, in Mr. Riddleâs case:
[I]t is important to recognize that Â§ 1129(b), the âcram-downâ subsection, âprovides only a minimum requirement for confirmation … so a court may decide that a plan is not fair and equitable even if it is in technical compliance with the Code’s requirements.â E.g., Atlanta Southern Business Park, 173 B.R. at 448. In this regard, it could be inequitable to conclude that a plan provision such as the one under consideration here is âfair and equitable,â if the provision serves no reorganization purpose. See Freymiller Trucking, 190 B.R. at 916. But in this case, the evidence shows that elimination of the Bank’s lien on other collateral is necessary for the reorganization of the Debtor and his ability to deal with all of the claims of other creditors who have accepted the Plan. No evidence demonstrates that the Plan is inequitable or unfair
In re Riddle, 444 B.R. 681, 686 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011).
Sunday, April 24th, 2011
One of the most effective vehicles for the rescue and revitalization of troubled business and real estate to emerge in recent years of Chapter 11 practice has been the “363 sale.”
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Named for the Bankruptcy Code section where it is found, the “363 sale” essentially provides for the sale to a proposed purchaser, free and clear of any liens, claims, and other interests, of distressed assets and land.
The section has been used widely in bankruptcy courts in several jurisdictions to authorize property sales for “fair market value” . . . even when that value is below the “face value” of the liens encumbering the property.
In the Ninth Circuit, however, such sales are not permitted – unless (pursuant to Section 363(f)(5)) the lien holder “could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.”
A recent decision issued early this year by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Panel and available here)Â provides a glimpse of how California bankruptcy court areÂ employing this statutory exception to approve “363 sales.”
East Airport Development (EAD) was a residential development project inÂ San Luis Obispo which, due to the downturn of the housing market, never came completely to fruition.
Originally financed with a $9.7 million construction and development loan in 2006, EAD’s obligation was refinanced at $10.6 million in mid-2009.Â By February 2010, the project found itself in Chapter 11 in order to stave off foreclosure.
A mereÂ two weeks after its Chapter 11 filing, EAD’s management requested court authorization to sell 2 of the 26 lots in the project free and clear of the bank’s lien, then to use the excess proceeds of the sale as cash collateral.
In support of this request, EAD claimed the parties had previously negotiatedÂ a pre-petition release price agreement.Â EAD argued the release price agreement was a âbinding agreement that may be enforced by non-bankruptcy law, which would compel [the bank] to accept a money satisfaction,â and also that the bank had consented to the sale of the lots.Â A spreadsheet setting forth the release prices was appended to the motion.Â The motion stated EAD’s intention to use the proceeds of sale to pay the bank the release prices and use any surplus funds to pay other costs of the case (including, inter alia, completion of a sewer system).
The bank objected strenuously to the sale.Â It argued there was no such agreement – and EAD’s attachment of spreadsheets and e-mails from bank personnel referencing such release prices ought to be excluded on various evidentiary grounds.
The bankruptcy court approved the sale and cash collateral use over these objections.Â The bank appealed.
On review, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellant Panel found, first,Â that the bankruptcy court was within the purview of its discretion to find that, in fact, a release price agreement did exist – and second, that such agreement was fully enforceable in California:
It is true that most release price agreements are the subject of a detailed and formal writing, while this agreement appears rather informal and was evidenced, as far as we can tell, by only a few short writings. However, this relative informality is not fatal. The bankruptcy court is entitled to construe the agreement in the context of and in connection with the loan documents, as well as the facts and circumstances of the case. Courts seeking to construe release price agreements may give consideration to the construction placed upon the agreement by the actions of the parties. . . . Here, the parties acted as though the release price agreement was valid and enforceable and, in fact, had already completed one such transaction before EAD filed for bankruptcy. On these facts, [EAD] had the right to require [the bank] to release its lien on the two lots upon payment of the specified release prices, even though [the bank] would not realize the full amount of its claim. More importantly, [EAD] could enforce this right in a specific performance action on the contract. For these reasons, the sale was proper under Â§ 363(f)(5).
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s East Airport decision provides an example of how bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit are creatively finding ways aroundÂ legal hurdles to getting “363 sales” approved in a very difficult California real estate market.Â It likewise demonstrates the level of care which lenders’ counsel must exercise in negotiating the work-out of troubled real estate projects.
Sunday, May 23rd, 2010
Practitioners and business people who have toiled in and around US-based restructuring work are well-acquainted with one of the great strengths (and primary threats) of Chapter 11:Â The ability of a debtor to restructure its secured obligations over the objection of a lender through the use of the “cram-down” procedures of Section 1129(b).
For those who may be less familiar, the concept of “cram-down” is not as difficult than the colorful term might suggest.Â Essentially, a debtor may confirm a Chapter 11 plan and restructure its debts over the objection of secured creditors so long as the debtor’s plan offers those creditors the present value of their allowed secured claims, such that they receive an appropriate rate of interest which accurately maintains the present value of their concern.
Fighting over “cram-down,” therefore, really boils down to fighting over which interest rate ought to apply to the lender’s restructured loan.
In an era where real estate and other collateralized capital assets are under significant duress (and “risk-free” rates of interest are near all-time lows), the issue of “cram-down” is once again a matter of immediate relevance – and its resolution can often spell the difference between restructuring or foreclosure.
Because the notion of “cram-down” has been part of US insolvency jurisprudence for decades, US Courts have accumulated considerable collective sophistication in addressing the financially-oriented evidence and arguments that surround “cram-down fights.”
But sophistication does not mean consistency.
Last week, Ray Clark of Orange County-headquartered VALCOR Consulting, LLC released a succinct overview of some of the more notable case law surrounding “cram down” developed in the years since the US Supreme Court decided Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 124 S.Ct. 1951 (2004).
Tracing several key cases issued by Circuit Courts of Appeal since Till, Ray – who has previously appeared on this blog as a guest – offers a very concise, readable summation of what it takes to win (or defeat) a “cram down” effort in Chapter 11.
One of Ray’s strengths is his ability to make the often unfamiliar and complex financial underpinnings of restructuring work accessible to the average, intelligent business person.Â His summary is available here – and is well worth a read.
Contact firstname.lastname@example.org or email@example.com.
Monday, March 1st, 2010
With both the global and regional Southern California economies showing early signs of life â but still lacking the broad-based demand for goods and services required for robust growth â opportunities abound for strong industry players to make strategic acquisitions of troubled competitors or their distressed assets.
Ray Clark, CFA, ASA and Senior Managing Director of VALCOR Consulting, LLC, is no stranger to middle-market deals.Â His advisory firm provides middle market restructuring, transactional and valuation services throughout the Southwestern United States from offices in Orange County, San Francisco, and Phoenix.
As most readers are likely aware, distressed mergers and acquisitions can be handled through a variety of deal structures.Â Last week, Ray dropped by South Bay Law Firm to offer his thoughts on a process commonly known in bankruptcy parlance as a âSection 363 sale.â
In particular, Ray covers the âpros and consâ of this approach.
The floor is yours, Ray.
Todayâs economic environment has created an opportunity to acquire assets of financially distressed entities at deeply discounted prices, and one of the most effective ways to make those acquisitions is through a purchase in the context of a bankruptcy under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (the âCodeâ).Â When purchasing the assets of a failed company under Section 363, there are distinct advantages to being first in line.Â Depending on the circumstances, however, it may be best to wait and let the process unfold – andÂ then, only after surveying the entire landscape, submit a bid.
The 363 Sale Process
A so-called â363 Saleâ is a sale of assets of a bankrupt debtor, wherein certain discrete assets such as equipment or real estate â or substantially all the debtor’s business assets â are sold pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 USC Â§363).Â Upon bankruptcy court approval, the assets will be conveyed to the purchaser free and clear of any liens or encumbrances. Those liens or encumbrances will then attach to the net proceeds of the sale and beÂ paid as ordered by the Bankruptcy Court.
A Section 363 sale looks much like a traditional controlled auction.Â Basic Section 363 sale mechanics include an initial bidder, often referred to as the âstalking horse,â who reaches an agreement to purchase assets – typically from the Chapter 11 debtor, or “debtor-in-possession” (DIP). Â The buyer and the DIP negotiate an asset purchase agreement (APA), which rewards the stalking horse for investing the effort and expense to sign a transaction that will be exposed to âhigher and betterâ or âoverâ bids.Â The Bankruptcy Court will approve the bidding procedures, including the incentives, i.e., a âbust-upâ fee, for the stalking horse bidder, and will pronounce clear rules for the remainder of the sale process. Â Notice of the sale will be given, qualified bids will arrive and there will be an auction. Â The sale to the highest bidder will commonly close within four to six weeks after the notice and the stalking horse will either acquire the assets or take home its bust-up fee and expense reimbursement as a consolation.Â
Advantages for the Stalking Horse Bidder
Bidding Protections - During negotiations with the debtor for the purchase of assets, the stalking horse will also typically negotiate certain protections for itself during the bidding process.Â These bidding protections, which include a bust-up fee and expense reimbursement, will be set forth in the 363 sale motion and are generally approved by the bankruptcy Court.Â As a result, stalking horse bidders seek to insulate themselves against the risk of being out-bid.Â To do so, proposed stalking-horse bidders commonly require that any outside bidder will typically have to submit not only a bid that is higher than that of the stalking horse, but will also need to include an amount to cover the stalking horse’s transactional fees and expenses.
Bidding Procedures – The stalking horse will also negotiate certain bidding procedures with the debtor, which will be set forth in the 363 sale motion that will be evaluated, and most likely approved, by the Court.Â The sale procedures generally include the time frame during which other potential bidders must complete their due diligence and the date by which competing bids must be submitted.
Other delineated procedures typically included in the motion include the amount of any deposit accompanying a bid and the incremental amount by which a competing bid must exceed the stalking horse bid. Â In addition, if the sale procedures provide for an abbreviated time frame in which to complete an investigation of the assets, a competing bidder will be at a distinct disadvantage and may be unable, as a result, to even submit a bid.
Deal Structure â As the first in line, the stalking horse bidder will also negotiate all of the important elements of the transaction, including which assets to acquire, what contracts â if any â to assume, the purchase price and other terms and conditions.Â In doing so, it establishes the ground rules by which the sale process will unfold and the framework for the transaction, which will be difficult, if not impossible, for another outside bidder to change.Â
âFirst Moverâ Advantage – The stalking horse bidder will typically be viewed by the Court as the favored asset purchaser in that it will have negotiated all of the relevant terms and procedures, and established its financial ability and intent to acquire the assets.Â As a result, short of an overbid by an outside party, which typically involves an additional amount to cover the stalking horseâs bust-up fee and expenses, the stalking horse bidder will prevail.
Cooperation of Stakeholders â As the lead bidder, the stalking horse also has an opportunity to negotiate with other key stakeholders in the process and establish a close relationship with those parties that may prove advantageous when all offers are evaluated.
Bust-up Fee and Expense Coverage â Lastly, if an outside party happens to submit the high bid, the stalking horse will typically receive its bust-up fee and expense reimbursement. This generally includes items such as due diligence fees, legal and accounting fees, and similar expenses, but is limited by negotiation.Â
Disadvantages to the Stalking Horse Bidder
Risk of Being Outbid â As noted, the stalking horse will expend a great deal of time, energy, and resources analyzing and negotiating for the purchase of the assets.Â All a competing bidder must do is show up to the sale and submit an over-bid.Â If the competing over-bidder prevails, the stalking horse runs the risk of walking away with only its bust-up fee and expense reimbursement.
Risk of Bidding Too High â After negotiating the APA, the stalking horse then participates in the 363 sale process.Â If no other bidders materialize, it may be because the stalking horse effectively over-paid for the assets.Â
Inability to Alter Terms â If some new information comes to light that would otherwise suggest a reduction in the price or alteration of the terms, the stalking horse may have difficulty altering either of these and may be locked in to the negotiated structure.
Contact firstname.lastname@example.orgÂ or email@example.com.
Meanwhile, happy hunting.
Sunday, August 16th, 2009
“There’s a cement slab on Ridge Lane, topped with a few pipes, an electrical box and a porta-john.Â Nearby, an empty house, a large sign in the driveway declaring ‘inventory home.’Â Around the corner, a few muddy lots, rimmed with construction fences … âIf [the developer] is gone,’ [Kathy] Koss [a resident in the neighborhood] said, âwhat is going to happen to these houses?’”
This quote from a story in March 15’s Charlotte Observer opens an extensive andÂ intriguing study assembled by Sarah P. Woo, entitled “A Blighted Land: An Empirical Study of Residential Developer Bankruptcies in the United States – 2007-2008.”Â Woo isÂ an independent risk management consultant and doctoral scholar at Stanford University with prior experience as a research manager at Moody’s KMV London and a background in corporate finance at White & Case LLP.Â She offers a simple premise as the basis for her 194-page work, which also serves as her dissertation:
Until the housing sector is stabilized, there will simply be no recovery in America.Â And as financially distressed residential developers and home builders are forced into liquidation or foreclosure, the unfinished projects they leave behind affect not only the immediate community, but area housing prices as well.
Woo is not alone in her assessment of the persistent weakness of the US residential housing sector.Â A Deutsche Bank study released in early August and briefly summarized in a CNN-Money article last Wednesday indicates that home prices may fall another 14% before hitting a bottom, leaving as many as 48% of mortgage holders “underwater” by 2011.
Among Woo’s findings on developers who have filed Chapter 11 cases over the last 2 years:
- Only 5.3% were able to successfully reorganize.Â In fact, the majority of cases were actually dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 – leaving real estate to be foreclosed or liquidated in forced sales.
- 72% of the cases sampled involved at least one request by a secured lender to lift the stay for purposes of foreclosure.Â In such instances, relief was granted approximately 90% of the time.Â However, foreclosure may not always have been the best outcome for the bank.Â According to Ms. Woo, “[i]n one case, the bank which repossessed the property not only had trouble with the remaining development process but also found itself in a position where it could not necessarily sell the property as a going concern . . . .Â InÂ [another] case, the bank which repossessed the property was seized by regulators 2 months later for being insufficiently capitalized, raising the issue of the extent to which a bank’s own financial problems might have contributed to its preference for liquidation during bankruptcy proceedings.”
- Where properties were disposed of through “363 sales,” Woo “uncovered a pattern of winning credit bids where secured lenders acquired the properties . . . at low prices.”
- Access to DIP financing appears to have been severely impaired for developers (as it has been for many Chapter 11 debtors this cycle, regardless of industry).Â Even where DIP financing has been available, such financing often occurred in cases where the debtor was ultimately liquidated or packaged for sale (again, a common scenario this cycle regardless of the debtor’s industry).
Is the near-certain prospect of liquidation or sale facing struggling residential home developers a good one for the sector?
On the one hand, Woo’s study appears to suggest that the control available to lenders through mechanisms such as DIP financing and stay relief litigation, employed by highly regulated and troubled US banks desperate to raise capital by seizing and liquidating collateral,Â puts housing developers who might reorganize in Chapter 11 on a very slippery slope with little prospect of survival.Â On the other, it suggests that the industry may be ridding itself of weak performers very quickly, leaving only the strongest to survive as the residential housing sector struggles back to prior levels.
Where real estate development and the residential housing sector are concerned, is the shortest way up . . . straight down?