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    Posts Tagged ‘Receivership’

    Squeezing the Most Value from Distressed Assets: Is Chapter 11 Always the Best Way?

    Monday, June 21st, 2010

    It is perhaps stating the obvious that Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code offers a well-known and very flexible means of extracting the most value from distressed assets.  But in these economic times, it is worth remembering that Chapter 11 is by no means the only avenue for addressing insolvency – nor is it always the best . . . or most appropriate.

    Bankruptcy (or “Section 363”) sales have been a time-honored and tested means of moving distressed assets quickly and cost-efficiently from buyer to seller.  But the lack of credit necessary to fund the transition period required for such sales during the recent downturn, combined with a handful of recent appellate decisions which cast doubt on the validity of contested sales, serve as reminders that other transactional structures sometimes work just as well – or even better.

    The folks at Turnaround Management Association (TMA) released a spate of articles last week which illustrate the point: Two of TMA’s pieces (one on ABC’s and Receiverships and one on alternative sale structures for distressed acquisitions) compare and contrast federal bankruptcy proceedings with other means of optimizing the transfer of distressed assets. A third focuses on “strict foreclosures” (or “Article 9 sales”).

    All three are well worth a read.

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    The Stanford Saga – Chapter 16: Settlin’ Words? Or Something Else?

    Monday, February 15th, 2010

    A brief update on Stanford (earlier posts are available here):

    Evidentiary hearings scheduled for late January in the ongoing struggle for control over the financial assets of Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB), the cornerstone of Allen Stanford’s financial-empire-turned-Ponzi-scheme, were cancelled by presiding US District Court Judge David Godbey.

    As readers of this blog are aware, Antiguan liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith’s efforts to obtain recognition in the US for their Antiguan wind-up of SIB, and US receiver Ralph Janvey’s competing efforts to do the same in Canadian and UK courts, were to culminate in a hearing set for late last month.  But shortly after a scheduled status conference on pre-hearing matters, the evidentiary was cancelled.

    Recent reporting by Reuters (available here) may provide a reason for the change: Reuters reported on February 5 that the liquidators and Mr. Janvey may, in fact, be settling. According to staff writer Anna Driver, a dispute over $370 million in assets traced to Stanford, as well as $200 million located in Switzerland and the UK, are driving the parties toward a deal.

    But there may be other pressures as well. The Associated Press reported (here) that last Thursday, Judge Godbey indicated his intent to rule on a request by third-party investors to commence their own involuntary bankruptcy filing, thereby replacing Mr. Janvey as a receiver.

    Stay tuned.

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    The Stanford Saga – Chapter 14: Fightin’ Words.

    Monday, January 4th, 2010

    Evidentiary hearings are scheduled for later this month in the ongoing struggle for control over the financial assets of Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB), the cornerstone of Allen Stanford’s financial-empire-turned-Ponzi-scheme.  A series of posts on this blog have covered liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith’s efforts to obtain recognition in the US for their Antiguan wind-up of SIB, and US receiver Ralph Janvey’s competing efforts to do the same in Canadian and UK courts.

    The Stanford case is of considerable significance in the US – and in the UK and Canada, where it has spawned at least two decisions and related appeals over the parties’ efforts to obtain cross-border recognition for their respective efforts to clean up the Stanford mess.

    In Dallas, Texas, where an enforcement action commenced by the American Securities and Exchange Commission remains pending (and where Mr. Janvey has been appointed as a receiver for the purposes of marshalling Stanford assets for distribution to creditors), US District Court Judge David Godbey has taken prior pleadings from both sides under advisement and, in advance of this month’s hearing, has requested further briefing on three issues.  Mr. Janvey’s brief, submitted last week, addresses each of these as follows:

    The Current State of Fifth Circuit Law on What Constitutes an Entity’s “Principal Place of Business,” Including Whether Stanford International Bank’s (“SIB”) Activities Were Active, Passive or “Far Flung.”

    The Liquidators have argued that, under applicable Fifth Circuit standards, SIB’s “principal place of business” was Antigua and that its activities were actively managed from Antigua, and were not “far flung” so as to render SIB’s Antiguan location irrelevant.

    Predictably enough, Mr. Janvey responds that under appropriate circumstances, the Fifth Circuit applies principles of alter ego and disregards corporate formalities in determining an entity’s “principal place of business:”  “The Fifth Circuit applies alter ego doctrines not only to enforce liability against shareholders and parent companies, but also to determine a corporation’s ‘principal place of business’ for jurisdictional purposes.” (citing Freeman v. Nw. Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1985)).

    Based on this construction of Fifth Circuit law – and because COMI is generally equated to an entity’s “principal place of business” under US corporate law –   Janvey then argues that consistency and logic require the same rules be followed for COMI purposes.  He then goes on to argue that Stanford’s Ponzi scheme activities were “far flung,” that SIB’s Antiguan operations were “passive,” and that its “nerve center” and “place of activity” were both in the U.S.

    The Relationship Between SIB and the Financial Advisors Who Marketed SIB’s CDs to Potential Investors.

    Wastell and Hamilton-Smith have argued that financial advisors who sold SIB’s CDs to potential investors were, in fact, independent agents employed by other, independent Stanford broker-dealer entities and were not controlled by SIB.

    Mr. Janvey pours scorn on this argument.  According to him, it does not matter that there were inter-company “contracts” purporting to make the Stanford broker-dealer entities agents for SIB in the sale of CDs.  As Mr. Janvey views it, a fraud is a fraud . . . from beginning to end.  Consequently, there was no substance to the “contracts” as all the entities involved were instruments of Stanford’s fraud.

    The “Single Business Enterprise” Concept as Part of the “Alter Ego” Theory of Imposing Liability.

    As noted above, Mr. Janvey takes the position that “alter ego” treatment of the Stanford entities is not only viable – it is the only appropriate means of treating SIB’s relationship to other, US-based Stanford entities, and of determining COMI for SIB.  He argues further that substantive consolidation – the bankruptcy remedy referred to by Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith – can be just as effectively accomplished through a federal receivership, which affords US District Courts significant latitude in fashioning equitable remedies and determining distributions to various classes of creditors.

    Mr. Janvey’s argument appears quite straightforward.  Because a fraud is a fraud, geography matters very little in determining its “center of main interests.”  According to him, what should count instead is the location of the fraudsters and the place from which the fraud was managed and directed.  Yet even Mr. Janvey acknowledges that “Antigua played a role in [Stanford’s Ponzi] scheme . . . [in that] [Antigua] was where Stanford could buy off key officials in order to conduct his sham business without regulatory interference.”  In other words, geography was important . . . at least for Stanford.  Specifically, geography provided Stanford direct access to a corrupt regulator who would afford cover for the conduct of Stanford’s fraudulent CD sales to investors.

    Mr. Janvey addresses this potential problem by taking aim at the entire Antiguan regulatory structure:

    “Chapter 15 contains a public policy exception: ‘Nothing in the chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.’ 11 U.S.C. § 1506. The facts warrant application of the public policy exception here. The very agency that first appointed the Antiguan [l]iquidators and then obtained their confirmation from the Antiguan court was complicit in Stanford’s fraud. That same agency has allowed financial fraud to flourish on Antigua for decades. It would be contrary to public policy for this Court to cede to Antigua the winding up of a company that bilked Americans and others out of billions when it was Antigua that permitted the fraud.”

    Mr. Janvey then goes further still, arguing that Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith (and their employer, British-based Vantis plc) are precluded by Antiguan law from complying with the disclosure requirements Judge Godbey has imposed on the US receivership – and therefore simply unable to concurrently administer a “main case” in Antigua and cooperate with the Receiver (or with the District Court) in the US.

    Finally, Mr. Janvey gets directly personal: He recites the opinion of the Canadian court that revoked Vantis’ administration of Stanford’s Canadian operations and refused recognition of the Antiguan wind-up on the grounds that “Vantis’ conduct, through [Messr’s. Wastell and Hamiton-Smith], disqualifies it from acting and precludes it from presenting the motion [for Canadian recognition], as [Vantis] cannot be trusted by the [Canadian] Court . . . .”  The Canadian court’s opinion has been upheld on appeal, and is now final.

    In a nutshell, Mr. Janvey argues that geography shouldn’t matter where a fraud is concerned . . . but if it does matter, it ought to count against jurisdictions such as Antigua, an “impoverished island” which has a population “about 80% that of Waco, Texas” and a history of financial fraud.

    As is sometimes said in Texas, “Them’s fightin’ words.”

    The SEC’s brief, like Mr. Janvey’s, is also on file.  Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith’s reply will be due shortly.

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    The Stanford Saga – Chapter 11: Is Something Rotten in the State of Antigua?

    Monday, November 16th, 2009

    As readers of this blog are aware, Antiguan liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith and federal receiver Ralph Janvey have been busy in several forums battling for control of the financial assets previously controlled by Allen Stanford, including Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB).  Prior posts are accessible here.

    Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith have filed numerous pleadings from other courts in support of their pending request, before US District Court Judge David Godbey, for recognition of their liquidation of SIB as a “main case” under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code.

    Mr. Janvey has recently filed his own copies of several recent rulings.  These include a ruling in which the Quebec Superior Court’s Mr. Justice Claude Auclair found that Vantis Business Recovery Services – a division of British accounting, tax, and advisory firm Vantis plc, and the firm through which Messr’s. Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith were appointed liquidators for SIB – should be removed from receivership of SIB’s Canadian operations.

    More recently, Mr. Janvey has filed a copy of a recently unsealed plea agreement between Stanford affiliate James Davis and federal prosecutors.

    Mr. Janvey’s papers provide a glimpse into Davis’ relationship with Stanford, and into the origins of SIB.  Summarized briefly:

    SIB’s Background

    – Davis’ and Stanford’s relationship dates back to the late 1980s, when Stanford retained Davis to act as the controller for then-Montserrat-based Guardian International Bank, Ltd.  Davis’ plea agreement recites that Stanford had Davis falsify the bank’s revenues and portfolio balances for banking regulators.  Continued regulatory scrutiny in Montserrat eventually led to Stanford’s closure of Guardian and removal of its banking operations to Antigua – where, in 1990, it resumed operations under the name of Stanford International Bank, Ltd.

    – SIB and a “web of other affiliated financial services companies” operated under the corporate umbrella of Stanford Financial Group.  SIB’s primary function was to market supposedly safe and liquid “certificates of deposit” (CDs).  By 2008, SIB had sold nearly $7 billion of them to investors worldwide.

    – Davis’ plea agreement further recites that investors were assured SIB’s operations were subject to scrutiny by the Antiguan Financial Services Regulatory Commission (FSRC), and to independent, outside audits.

    SIB’s Asset Allocation and Operations

    – In fact, SIB investor funds were neither safe nor secure.  According to Davis’ plea agreement, investor funds did not go into the marketed CDs.  Instead, they were placed into three general “tiers”: (i) cash and cash equivalents (“Tier I”); (ii) investments managed by outside advisors (“Tier II”); and (iii) “other” investments (“Tier III”).  By 2008, the majority of SIB’s investor funds – approximately 80% – were held in “highly illiquid real and personal property” in “Tier III,” including $2 billion in “undisclosed, unsecured personal loans” to Allen Stanford.  A further 10% was held in “Tier II.”  The remaining 10% balance was presumably held in “Tier I.”

    – Likewise, SIB’s operations were not subject to any meaningful scrutiny.  Davis’ plea agreement recites that in or about 2002, Stanford introduced him to Leroy King, a former Bank of America executive and Antiguan ambassador to the US, and soon-to-be Chief Executive Officer of the FSRC.  Stanford, King, and another FSRC employee responsible for regulatory oversight performed a “blood oath” brotherhood ceremony sometime in 2003 – ostensibly to cement their commitment to one another and King’s commitment to the protection of SIB – i.e., to “ensure that Antiguan bank regulators would not ‘kill [SIB’s] business'” in Antigua.

    – Though blood may be thicker than water, it is not thicker than cash: Stanford’s and King’s “brotherhood” was cemented further by bribes paid to King for his protection of SIB.  Acccording to Davis’ plea agreement, these bribes ultimately exceeded $200,000.  In return for this largesse, King reassigned two overly inqusitive Antiguan examiners of which Stanford complained sometime in 2003.  In 2005 and again in 2006, King further cooperated with Stanford in providing misleading responses to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s inquiries to the FSRC, in which the SEC divulged to the FSRC that it had evidence of SIB’s involvement in a “possible Ponzi scheme.”  King and Stanford similarly collaborated in responding to a 2006 inquiry by the Director of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank’s Bank Supervision Department regarding SIB’s affiliate relationship with the Bank of Antigua.

    SIB’s Financial Reporting

    – A central premise of Stanford’s approach to soliciting investments – and, perhaps understandably, a central point of interest for would-be investors – was that SIB must show a profit each year.  To accomplish this, Davis and Stanford reportedly initially determined false revenue numbers for SIB.  Ultimately, this collaboration gave rise to a fabricated annual “budget” for SIB, which would show financial growth.  Using these “budgeted” growth numbers, Stanford accounting employees working in St. Croix would generate artificial revenues (and resulting artificial ROIs), which were then transmitted to Stanford’s Chief Accounting Officer in Houston and ultimately to Davis in Mississippi for final adjustment and approval before making their way back to the Caribbean for reporting to SIB investors.

    – According to Davis’ plea agreement, “[t]his continued routine false reporting . . . created an ever-widening hole between reported assets and actual liabilities, causing the creation of a massive Ponzi scheme . . . .  By the end of 2008, [SIB reported] that it held over $7 billion in assets, when in truth . . . [SIB] actually held less than $2 billion in assets.”

    – In about mid-2008, Stanford, Davis, and others attempted to plug this “hole” created by converting a $65 million real estate transaction in Antigua into a $3.2 billion asset of SIB through a “series of related party property flips through business entities controlled by Stanford.”

    SEC Subpoenas and SIB’s Insolvency

    – By early 2009, the SEC had issued subpoenas related to SIB’s investment portfolio.  At a February meeting held in advance of SEC testimony, Stanford management determined that SIB’s “Tier II” assets were then valued at approximately $350 million – down from $850 million in mid-2008.  Management further determined that  and SIB’s “Tier III” assets consisted of (i) real estate acquired for less than $90 million earlier in the year, but now valued at more than $3 billion; (ii) $1.6 billion in “loans” to Stanford; and (iii) other private equity investments.  Davis’ plea agreement recites that at that same meeting, and despite the apparent disparity between actual and reported asset values, Stanford insisted that SIB had “‘at least $850 million more in assets than liabilities.'”  In a separate meeting later that day, however, Stanford reportedly acknowledged that SIB’s “assets and financial health had been misrepresented to investors, and were overstated in [SIB’s] financials.”

    Janvey doesn’t describe exactly how these acknowledged facts integrate into his prior opposition to the Antiguan liquidators’ request for recognition.  His prior pleadings have questioned indirectly the integrity of the Antiguan wind-up proceedings; consequently, Mr. King’s role in protecting SIB under the auspices of the Antiguan FSRC may well be the point.  Likewise, Janvey may point to the US-based control and direction of financial reporting manipulations that ultimately created a $5 billion “hole” in SIB’s asset structure as evidence of the American origin of SIB’s allegedly fraudulent operations.  Or the filing may be intended to blunt the effect of a previously filed detention order – issued by another US District Court and affirmed by the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals – confining Stanford to the US and observing that his ties to Texas were “tenuous at best.”

    It remains for Judge Godbey to determine whether – and in what way and to what degree – Davis’ plea agreement impacts on the liquidators’ request for a determination that SIB’s “center of main interests” remains in Antigua.

    For the moment, the parties await his decision.

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    The Stanford Saga – Chapter 10: “Bleak House” Redux?

    Monday, October 19th, 2009

    Postings on this blog have focused on the cross-border battle between Antiguan liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith and federal receiver Ralph Janvey for control of the financial assets previously controlled by Sir Allen Stanford, including Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB).  A complete digest of prior posts is available here.

    Mr. Janvey, meanwhile, has had to address yet another challenge to his receivership – from investors seeking to commence an involuntary Chapter 7 case.  In early September, an ad hoc group of CD and deposit-holders fronted by Dr. Samuel Bukrinsky, Jaime Alexis Arroyo Bornstein, and Mario Gebel requested an expedited hearing on their request for leave to commence an involuntary bankruptcy against the Stanford entities.

    The ad hoc investor group’s September request was not their first: In May of this year, the same investors requested essentially the same relief.  That request was never acted on, presumably because presiding US District Court Judge David Godbey already had imposed a 6-month moratorium on interference with the receivership.

    With the moratorium’s expiration, the investors have raised the issue once again.

    A Receivership Run Wild?

    Their second request largely repeats the investors’ prior arguments, many of them rather personal: No one is happy with the way this receivership has been run, they claim.  Specifically, the receivership is far too expensive and the lack of meaningful participation deprives creditors of significant due process rights.  Instead, an involuntary liquidation under Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code is the best and most efficient means of reining in expenses and preserving those rights.  The investors’ brief offers a picture of the 21st century Stanford receivership more closely resembling Dickens’ 19th century “Bleak House”: Professional fees accruing at an “alarming” rate (in this case, an estimated $1.1M per week); an estate at risk of being consumed entirely by administrative costs; and investors ultimately twice victimized.

    The investors further argue that an injunction prohibiting creditors’ access to the US bankruptcy system is, at best, an interim measure.  As such, it can never be employed on a permanent basis – and, therefore, cannot survive the standards for injunctive relief articulated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  They cite a variety of decisions which stand – according to them – for the proposition that the US Bankruptcy Court offers the best forum for complex liquidations such as the one at hand.

    Creditors Who Don’t Know What’s Best For Them?

    Predictably, Mr. Janvey disagrees in the strongest terms.

    As he sees it (and as he sees a string of federal cases referenced in his response), a federal equity receivership – and not a federal bankruptcy proceeding – is the accepted, “decades-long practice” of federal courts in winding up entities that were the subject of alleged Ponzi schemes and other frauds.  Moreover, Mr. Janvey suggests that if creditors are dissatisfied with the expense and claimed inefficiency of this proceeding, transition to a liquidation under the US Bankruptcy Code would be even more so.  In support, Mr. Janvey offers a “parade of horribles,” such as the “procedural nightmare” involved in transitioning much of the complex litigation already underway in the receivership to a bankruptcy trustee’s administration, the likely existence of multiple creditors’ committees (and the attendant expense of their counsel), and the need to sort out the Antiguans liquidators’ competing Chapter 15 recognition request even if a Chapter 7 petition is filed.

    Perhaps most significantly, however, Mr. Janvey believes that flexibility regarding a plan of distribution should govern the administration of the Stanford matters:

    Like the Bankruptcy Code, equity receiverships ensure that persons similarly situated receive similar treatment. In a case such as this involving massive deception, however, a searching evaluation of the facts is required to discern relevant differences between and among categories of creditors. Unlike a trustee in bankruptcy, the Receiver can take into account relative fault within a class of creditors, and fashion an equitable plan of distribution that does not treat all creditors within a class identically if they are not deserving of equal treatment.

    Mr. Janvey does not develop how a receiver’s application of equitable principles might differ from the equitable and other subordination provisions of Bankruptcy Code section 510.  Ultimately, his response reduces itself to a simple proposition for Judge Godbey and for creditors:

    “Trust me.”

    Unfortunately, Messr’s. Bukrinsky, Bornstein, and Gebel do not.  Their reply brief – submitted last Friday – again reiterates that the Stanford receivership has outlived its usefulness in this highly complex insolvency.  According to them, the Stanford record speaks for itself.  It is time for a new regime.

    Like the liquidators’ request for US recognition of their Antiguan-based wind-up of SIB, the parties now await Judge Godbey’s decision.

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    The Stanford Saga – Chapter 9: “As If We Don’t Have Safes In Canada!”

    Monday, September 21st, 2009

    A brief update in the ongoing struggle between Antiguan liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith and federal receiver Ralph Janvey over control of the financial assets previously controlled by Sir Allen Stanford, including Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB):

    Readers of this blog will be aware that several recent court rulings – including a detention order for Sir Allen issued by the US District Court and recognition orders issued in England and Canada – have threatened to undermine Mr. Janvey’s position in a Dallas receivership before US District Judge David Godbey, where Stanford’s financial assets are under court control.  For details on each of these orders and on other aspects of the Stanford matters, see prior posts located here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

    Recently, however, Mr. Janvey may have gotten a little help . . . from North of the border.

    In related rulings issued Friday, September 11, Mr. Justice Claude Auclair of the Quebec Superior Court found that Vantis Business Recovery Services – a division of British accounting, tax, and advisory firm Vantis plc, and the firm through which Messr’s. Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith were appointed liquidators for SIB – should be removed from receivership of SIB’s Canadian operations.

    According to a report by Toronto’s Globe and Mail, Mr. Justice Auclair found that Wastell and Hamilton-Smith’s firm acted improperly in destroying original computer evidence from SIB’s Montreal branch office and “stonewalled efforts by Quebec’s financial authority – the Autorité des marchés financiers [the Financial Market Authority] – to get access to the copied information.”

    In verbal rulings that will cost the liquidators control of the Canadian receiverhsip (which will now go to Ernst & Young Canada), Mr. Justice Auclair reportedly “derided” Vantis’ “high-handed” behavior after an Antiguan court made appointments to wind down SIB – and its Montreal office – and recover funds for alleged Canadian victims.

    Reacting to arguments that Antiguan banking privacy laws prevented direct disclosure of information to the Canadian authorities and that destruction of SIB’s Montreal computer databases was necessary to keep them out of the hands of creditors seeking to repossess SIB’s Montreal office, Mr. Justice Auclair is said to have retorted, “As if we don’t have any safes in Canada to protect and preserve” such materials.

    As if, indeed.

    In pleadings filed with the US District Court, Mr. Janvey previously complained that the liquidators “erased all SIB electronic data from SIB servers in Montreal, removed data to Antigua, and attempted to seize over US$21 million in SIB funds through an ex parte legal proceeding in which they failed to disclose to the Canadian court the existence of [the receivereship] and the appointment of the US Receiver”  Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith have, of course, indignantly disclaimed Mr. Janvey’s “scurrilous and specious accusations of misconduct” regarding their administration of Canadian assets.

    Whether or not it is “scurrilous” or “specious,” the liquidators’ conduct has apparently created controversy with more than Mr. Janvey alone, if the Globe and Mail‘s account is accurate.

    Meanwhile, the parties await Judge Godbey’s ruling in Dallas.

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    The Stanford Saga – Chapter 7: Sir Allen Weighs In . . . Sort Of

    Monday, August 10th, 2009

    Since mid-July, Antiguan liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith and federal receiver Ralph Janvey have awaited Judge David Godbey’s decision on the liquidators’ request for recognition of their liquidation of Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB), now pending in Antigua.

    As discussed in a number of previously-published posts (here, here, here, here, here, and . . . here), Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith have been at odds with Mr. Janvey, who was appointed in Dallas’ U.S. District Court for the purpose of administering assets previously controlled by Sir Allen Stanford – including, presumably, SIB.  Stanford’s assets and creditors span at least three continents – North America, South America, and Europe – and have spawned insolvency proceedings in several countries.  Despite the apparent breadth of Judge Godbey’s original receivership order, the liquidators previously requested – and Judge Godbey (over Mr. Janvey’s strenuous objection) granted – a modification to that order for the purpose of commencing a case under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code on SIB’s behalf.

    While the parties await a ruling on recognition of the Chapter 15 case, Mr. Janvey’s receivership continues forward, with pleadings filed almost daily on a variety of issues.  Among the matters awaiting resolution in the receivership is a request by Sir Allen that raises issues which themselves may impact Judge Godbey’s decision on recognition.

    In early July, Sir Allen filed a seemingly innocuous request for permission to certify tax returns for a number of Antiguan corporations.  He argued that the Antiguan court already had held these companies outside the U.S. District Court’s jurisdiction – and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the receivership.  Nevertheless, respect for the U.S. District Court and a preference for consistency between courts regarding the extent of the District Court’s jurisdiction made prudent a request further amendment of the receivership order to permit Stanford’s exercise of these corporate formalities.  A failure to exercise such formalities in short order would, according to Sir Allen, subject the corporations to being stricken from the Antiguan Companies Register.

    About 2 weeks ago, Mr. Janvey fired back with an 8-page opposition.  In it, he argued that (i) the Antiguan court’s refusal to recognize his American receivership remains on appeal; (ii) Mr. Janvey himself never has been provided copies of the returns Sir Allen seeks to certify; (iii) Sir Allen has declined Mr. Janvey’s requests for these returns, apparently, on the basis that doing so would violate his 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination under the US Constitution; and (iv) should Judge Godbey wish to preserve the Antiguan corporations in question from sanction, he need merely designate Mr. Janvey or his agent to certify the returns.  Janvey’s arguments are based on his fundamental contention that corporate separateness should be disregarded where the corporate form has been used for a fraudulent purpose – and where the corporations in question have been used for this purpose, they ought to be treated as “alter egos” of Stanford himself and therefore are within the ambt of the District Court’s jurisdiction.

    Last Thursday, Sir Allen replied.  Relying once again on the Antiguan court’s prior denial of American jurisdiction over the corporations, Sir Allen insists that Mr. Janvey has no greater jurisdiction than the U.S. Court which appointed him – and that Judge Godbey cannot simply ignore the prior Antiguan ruling.  Further, Sir Allen insists that his prior general assertion of 5th Amendment rights doesn’t justify an inference of fraudulent activity regarding these corporations – and that Mr. Janvey has never provided any other evidence in support of these allegations.

    Distilled to their essence, the parties’ positions closely parallel similar issues relevant to the Antiguan liquidators’ pending recognition request.  They also highlight a number of the complicated questions underlying that request, such as:

    - What should be the effect of the Antiguan court’s prior order regarding Janvey’s receivership?  Should the liquidators’ request for recognition of SIB’s liquidation be treated differently than Stanford’s request to certify returns for the Antiguan companies?  Or should a similar analysis apply to both orders?  How should the U.S. case law doctrine of comity (i.e., American courts’ respect for the rulings of foreign courts) – which informed many prior requests for ancillary relief under the US Bankruptcy Code and which even today informs much of the policy behind Chapter 15 – apply in either case?

    - To what extent, if any, should allegations of fraudulent intent be relevant to determining the Stanford companies’ applicable “center of main interests” (COMI) – a decision critical to the relief that the liquidators seek?  And if the allegations of fraud were relevant, what would be the level of evidence ncessary to establish the requisite fraud?

    - To what extent, if any, must an equitable receivership commenced in aid of a governmental enforcement action arising from alleged violations of US securities laws bend to the statutory provisions of cross-border commercial insolvency law?  And to what extent, if any, is a US Court able to uphold such enforcement in the face of a foreign court’s order (or, as here, multiple orders) apparently limiting its jurisdiction?

    As with the recognition request, the parties now await Judge Godbey’s ruling.

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    Chapter 15 Round-Up: May and June 2009

    Friday, July 3rd, 2009

    2009 is shaping up to be an extraordinary year for business bankruptcy.  Headlines and hoopla aside, however, it hasn’t been all about domestic Chapter 11 work.  The following brief summaries (drawn from news reports and from the national dockets) highlight some of the more newsworthy cross-border matters of the past 60 days:

    WC Wood – Guelph, Ontario-based W.C. Wood Ltd., manufacturer of freezers, fridges and commercial dehumidifiers, sought Chapter 15 recognition in Delaware along with its affiliates concurrently with the companies’ application for protection under the Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.  The US filing was commenced to further the Canadian reorganization, and to extend the automatic stay to protect officers and directors of the companies.

    Kumkang Valve – Kumkang Valve Co. Ltd. sought Chapter 15 recognition in Houston to protect its US -based assets while it pursued a “revival proceeding” in the District Bankruptcy Court for Daegu, South Korea, where it is headquartered. To do so, the manufacturer of trunnion mount ball valves for the oil and gas industry had to overcome objections lodged by Enterprise Products Operating LLC, who had previously filed a US District Court suit alleging that Kumkang knowingly supplied faulty valves to Enterprise when it was constructing facilities in Wyoming and Colorado.  Bankruptcy Judge Wesley Steen is presiding over the US proceeding.

    Gandi Innovations – Canadian grand-format inkjet manufacturer Gandi Innovations, which operates under the brand name Gandinnovations, obtained recognition from Bankruptcy Judge Leif Clark in San Antonio, TX very shortly after its entry into Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings.  The company sought to protect US assets and stay litigation then pending in Bexar County, TX while it prosecuted a plan of arrangement in Toronto.

    Straumur-Burdaras Investment Bank – Iceland’s Straumur-Burdaras Investment Bank hf is seeking recognition of its Reykjavík-based restructuring efforts from New York Bankruptcy Judge Robert E. Gerber. Recognition would protect Straumur-Burdaras’ US-based assets, valued at $190 million.  The commercial bank’s Chapter 15 petition, filed June 2, follows that of three other Icelandic financial institutions – Glitnir Banki hf, Kaupthing Bank hf and Landsbanki Islands hf – all of which sought similar protection in New York. Straumur-Burdaras’ recognition hearing is calendared for July 14.

    Fraser Papers – Toronto-based lumber, pulp and paper producer Fraser Papers Inc. and affiliates sought recognition in Delaware for their restructuring under the Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). According to papers filed in connection with the related June 18 petitions, the filing was commenced to further the effect of orders already entered under the CCAA and designed both to protect the companies’ US assets and to enjoin suits against officers and directors.

    Nanbu – Tokyo-based Nanbu Inc. has requested that US Bankruptcy Judge Robert J. Faris of Honolulu grant recognition of its foreign bankruptcy proceeding currently pending in the Civil Affairs division of Tokyo District Court. Court papers reveal virtually nothing about the company or its Japanese proceeding, and note only that recognition was sought in the US so that the company’s foreign representative, Tsunehiro Sasanami, can take title to and convey certain timeshare properties located in Hawaii.  A hearing on the recognition request is calendared for July 13; however, under the Bankruptcy Court’s local rules, a recognition order may be entered without a formal hearing where there are no objections.

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    The Stanford Saga – Chapter 4: Where Is a Ponzi Scheme “Headquartered,” Anyway?

    Tuesday, June 16th, 2009

    This blog has intermittently followed the Texas-sized contest for control over now-defunct financial and investment entities once operated by Sir Allen Stanford.  That contest has pitted Antiguan liquidators Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith against federal receiver Ralph Janvey.  Prior posts are located here, here, and here.

    Approximately one month ago, US District Judge David Godbey permitted Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith to commence a Chapter 15 case on behalf of Stanford International Bank (SIB), headquartered in Antigua.  A hearing regarding the liquidators’ request for US recognition of SIB’s liquidation is tentatively calendared for mid-July.  The parties have submitted a joint status report and have also filed further briefing on the question of the Stanford entities’ “Center of Main Interests” (COMI) – which the parties believe will determine the location of a “main proceeding” for the Stanford entities, and will further determine what (if any) recognition US courts will give that proceeding.

    Briefing and evidence submitted to date provides a preview of the parties’ positions, as well as on the issues that the Judge Janvey will need to address:

    COMI.  A supplemental affidavit submitted by Mr. Hamilton-Smith in support of recognition appears to stress both (i) SIB’s corporate separation from other Stanford entities; and (ii) its function as the effective “nerve center” of global Stanford investment operations.  In a 50-page response to the Liquidators’ petition for recognition, Mr. Janvey argues that (i) the Stanford entities’ principal interests, assets, and management are not in Antigua; (ii) SIB was a mere “shell” for a fraudulent scheme headquarted in, and implemented from, the US; and (iii) COMI is the location from which the fraud emanates, and not from the location where investors have been duped into believing a legitimate business was run.  And lest we forget matters of policy, the Receiver offers the somewhat conclusory arguments that because a receivership (rather than a bank liquidation) is the appropriate means of investigating a fraud, because the Antiguan government is somehow too close to this liquidation, and because the liquidators have allegedly attempted to “end run” the Receivership by obtaining a recognition order in Canada (an allegation bitterly contested by the Antiguan Liquidators), recognition of a Chapter 15 would be against public policy.  A concurrent response filed by the SEC largely concurs in these arguments.  The SEC appears to rely heavily on the US citizenship of Mr. Stanford and most members of his board of directors (in fact, “Sir Allen” holds joint US-Antiguan citizenship), the purported location of management decisions (according to the SEC, within the US), and the comparative dollar volume of SIB investment sales in the US as the primary basis for opposing the request to recognize SIB’s Antiguan liquidation as the “main proceeding.”

    Substantive Consolidation?  The parties’ briefs to date raise the issue of substantive consolidation (or “aggregation”).  The Liquidators advise Judge Godbey that they expect the Receiver to argue in support of substantive consolidation of the Stanford entities.  Mr. Janvey never directly addresses his position on substantive consolidation, calling it a “bankruptcy question” which is appropriate only in the event that multiple Stanford entities find themselves in bankruptcy in the US (a possibility triggered by filings briefly mentioned below).  However, Janvey goes on to reiterate his position that the Stanford entities must be treated as part of a single, integrated receivership, since the Stanford entities operated as a single “integrated network.”

    Involuntary Proceedings?  The parties’ joint status report mentions a request by certain investors for permission to file involuntary bankruptcies in the US against one or more of the Stanford entities.  That request has been opposed by the Receiver, who argues that rather than bankruptcy, a federal receivership (i) is really the best way to adminsiter an alleged Ponzi scheme; (ii) protects creditors’ and investors’ due process (and bankruptcy doesn’t?!); and (iii) provides the maximum degree of flexibility, essential to the equitable relief and redress this case requires.  The Examiner disagrees with the Receiver, suggesting that Judge Godbey can – and, indeed, should – evaluate the relative merits of a bankruptcy (rather than a receivership) for the Stanford entities, but cautions that the investors must demonstrate the relative benefits of such a proceeding vis á vis a receivership.

    Cooperation?  In a now-familiar refrain, the Receiver and the Antiguan Liquidators blame each other for failing to cooperate, all the while holding out their own respective proposed cooperation schemes.  Mr. Hamilton-Smith’s affidavit (mentioned above) proposes a general framework of cooperation in the event that a request for recognition of SIB’s liquidation is approved.  The same investors seeking permission to commence an involuntary proceeding (also mentioned above) argue that, in fact, Chapter 15 provides the best vehicle for cross-border coordination no matter where the “center of main interests” is ultimately determined.

    Further briefing – and some decisions – are due later in the month.

    Overall, it’s shaping up to be a hot summer in Texas.

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    The Stanford Saga – Chapter 2: Too Many Cooks In the Kitchen?

    Saturday, May 16th, 2009

    A prior post on this blog mapped out the field of combat in the brewing battle between SEC receiver Ralph Janvey and Antiguan liqudators Nigel Hamilton-Smith and Peter Wastell for control of the now-defunct financial empire of Sir Allen Stanford, the native Texan who acceded to Antiguan knighthood but who now stands accused of running an alleged world-wide Ponzi scheme.

    That battle has now commenced.

    To review, the Securities and Exchange Commission obtained appointment of a receiver for Stanford’s assets and the Antiguan government appointed liquidators for Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIB) within 3 days of one another.  The Receiver’s and the liquidators’ initial attempts to cooperate degenerated into a battle for control over global efforts to marshal assets and make distributions to creditors.

    The parties recently brought their disputes before the US District Court in Dallas, where Judge David Godbey must now decide (i) whether his previously-issued receivership order (which prohibited the commencement of any bankruptcy proceeding during the pendency of the SEC receviership) should be modified to permit the liquidators’ commencement of a Chapter 15 case regarding SIB; and (ii) whether the Chapter 15 proceedings (if any) ought to be referred back to the Dallas bankruptcy court (itself a division of the District Court).

    A hearing on these disputes has yet to be scheduled.  However, the parties have put forth the following arguments (to see the parties’ respective briefs, click on each applicable party’s name):

    The US Government.  The federal government – and more specifically, the SEC and the Internal Revenue Service – oppose the commencement of a Chapter 15.  

    The IRS complains that doing so will disrupt its efforts to litigate tax claims against Sir Allen.  In essence, the IRS trusts Judge Godbey’s ability to facilitate this litigation more than it does the Antiguan court system.  It also warns that the Antiguan liquidation scheme will not respect the IRS’s asserted tax liens against Stanford’s assets – including SIB assets – and will not sufficiently protect US taxpayers and investors.

    The SEC, in an argument that appears somewhat circular, reminds Judge Godbey that he originally imposed a stay on extraneous litigation in connection with the receivership; therefore, that stay ought not to be modified because . . . to do so would countenance extraneous litigation.

    In a footnote, the SEC signals its willingness to appeal an adverse ruling by noting that where the receivership order has already been appealed by other third parties, Judge Godbey is without jurisdiction to make any further amendments to it – but must instead preserve the status quo.  At a substantive level, the SEC intimates that the pre-liquidation relationship between SIB and the Antiguan goverment was overly cozy and that because SIB lent over US$100 million to the Antiguan government (and holds approximately $84 million in receivables payable by the Antiguan government), the Antiguan court’s judgment (and, by extension, that of the liquidators) in handling the Antiguan liquidation is not to be trusted.  At an equitable level, the SEC argues that the Antiguan liquidators may not urge the Antiguan courts to ignore the SEC’s receivership, then request that Judge Godbey recognize their liquidation.

    The Receiver.  Mr. Janvey – himself acting as the arm of the District Court’s equitable jurisdiction – argues that the Court’s exclusive control over the Stanford entities through his receivership is . . . well, equitable. 

    Janvey’s 24-page brief is generally consistent with that of the SEC and, in the end, reduces itself to the old adage that “there are too many cooks in the kitchen”: It accuses Messr’s. Wastell and Hamilton-Smith of grabbing for control of substantially all of the Stanford entities’ assets through their administration of one Stanford entity, of attempting to “end run” the Texas receivership through a Canadian proceeding, of standing idly by while the Antiguan government seeks to appropriate Antiguan real estate otherwise available for general creditors’ benefit, and of generally hampering the Receiver’s job.

    Mr. Janvey further argues there is nothing to preclude the District Court from exercising its very broad equitable powers to enjoin a Chapter 15 proceeding.

    The Examiner.  In a thoughtful brief, John Little – an Examiner appointed by Judge Godbey to assist him in running the receivership – advises the Court that, in fact, it is a good idea to first permit the commencement of a Chapter 15 case, then to address the validity of the Antiguan liquidators’ requests for recogntion on their own legal and factual merits.

    Essentially, Mr. Little, while not disagreeing that a District Court sitting in equity has broad discretion, suggests that Judge Godbey utilize that discretion to grant the liquidators’ request, then determine (i) whether Messr’s. Hamilton-Smith’s and Wastell’s request for recognition is viable or otherwise impermissible on the grounds that SIB is a “foreign bank,” ineligible for Chapter 15 relief; and (ii) if recognition applies, whether SIB’s “center of main interests” is Antigua, or elsewhere.

    The Liquidators.  Messr’s. Hamilton-Smith and Wastell call the Receiver’s and the SEC’s mud-slinging exactly what it is . . . then waste precious little time in slinging their own.

    In a number of reprises, all of which end in the same refrain – “The Pot is Calling the Kettle Black” – the Antiguan liquidators bristle with indignance at the misconduct alleged of them, accuse Mr. Janvey and his federal government allies of misstating both the facts and the law, and point out that many of the “parade of horribles” supposedly arising in Antiguan insolvency proceedings apply with equal force (or much worse) in US-based federal equitable receiverships.

    They note, for example, that Judge Godbey’s refusal to entertain a request for recognition will do nothing to prohibit courts with Stanford-related insolvency proceedings now pending in the UK, Switzerland, and Canada from refusing the same recogntion to Mr. Janvey – and will therefore fail to accomplish the global administration and control Mr. Janvey seeks.  Likewise, the IRS’s complaint that Antiguan insolvency proceedings do not embrace a priority scheme analogous to the US Bankruptcy Code strikes Messr’s. Hamilton-Smith and Wastell as ironic, since the distribution that arises under a federal receivership is entirely arbitrary, and effectively outside any statutory distribution scheme (including the US Bankruptcy Code’s). 

    Amidst the name-calling and the attempts to find precedent in a federal receivership which appears, by all accounts, to be one of first impression, it may be easy to miss the importance – and the potential – of the wide discretion provided to the US District Court in Chapter 15.

    This discretion appears in at least two ways.

    First, a US Court applying Chapter 15 is generally free to communicate and coordinate insolvency proceedings directly with courts of other jurisdictions.  Prior to Chapter 15’s enactment, it was common practice for separate courts administering a multi-national insolvency to confer directly by means of “protocols” specifically designed for the purpose of administering the case at hand.  These “protocols” – often individually negotiated for a specific case – facilitated adminsitration and helped coordinate the rulings of various courts for maximum efficiency and uniformity.  Much of this former practice lives on in Chapter 15: Section 1525 specifically codifies and authorizes it, while Section 1527 lists several, non-exclusive means of such cooperation.  

    Second, US Courts applying Chapter 15 have broad discretion to grant, modify, or otherwise tailor relief for foreign representatives, thereby shaping the administration of a foreign case inside the US.  Though certain types of relief are “automatic” upon recognition of a foreign “main” case, Section 1522 permits a court to “modify or terminate” much of the relief available to foreign representatives on its own motion, and in a manner which protects all of the entities involved.

    How might a Chapter 15 proceeding alleviate some of the rancor that has developed between Mr. Janvey and his Antiguan counterparts?

    Perhaps some coordination and cooperation of the sort envisioned by the Bankruptcy Code – for example, web conferencing between judges in Antigua, the UK, the US, Canada, and Switzerland designed to develop a “Stanford protocol” within the context of Chapter 15’s provisions and foster unified worldwide administration of the Stanford cases – would go some distance toward establishing the judicial “end game” that preserves the integrity of the federal receivership process and of the foreign insolvency proceedings.

    Along the way, the same cooperation might further demonstrate the remarkable flexibility of Chapter 15.  And who knows?  It might prevent all of the cooks in the kitchen from hitting one another with blackened pots . . . thereby preserving a little more for Stanford’s creditors and investors.

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